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Abstract 
I consider what the work of the scholar in the age of searchable 
information networks. I do this with regard to both intellectual 
inquiry and the political motivations of scholarship. I also ex-
plore the notions of books and technology. 
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Chapter 1: The Scholar’s Work Alongside the Network 
 
How useful, when roasted meats and other foods are before 
you, to see them in your mind as here the dead body of a 
fish, there the dead body of a bird or pig. Or again, to 
think of Falernian wine as the juice of a cluster of 
grapes, of a purple robe as sheep’s wool dyed with the 
blood of a shellfish, and of sexual intercourse as internal 
rubbing accompanied by a spasmodic ejection of mucus. (Au-
relius, 2006, p. 47) 
 
The passage above is my favorite from Marcus Aurelius’s Medita-
tions. Quoting it is possibly the most exhaustive way to ruin a 
date that’s gone well. Though it might not seem so, there’s 
something potentially more unsettling than the Stoic definition 
of sex. It’s what’s said about human work in the penultimate re-
mark of the same passage: Nam gravis impostor est fastus, et 
quando maxime putas, te res serias agere, tum maxime in fraudem 
inducit. In other words, when you most think you’re making or 
doing something serious, that’s when you’re maximally duped by 
pride. I feel especially duped, after having spent over an hour 
perfecting a translation of the Latin, which I hadn’t realized 
was a translation itself. Though Marcus Aurelius was a Roman em-
peror, the Meditations were originally written in Greek. If 
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you’re ever curious about how to lose friends and alienate peo-
ple, you might prompt a colleague who studies sexuality to talk 
about their research, only to interrupt them with, “Ah, you’re 
in genital friction studies!” I try to avoid it, but sometimes 
what’s impressed on my mind is that the pursuit of a PhD is not 
but the almost decade long preparation to write a document that 
four people will read. All this is literally true, but one would 
hope that this type of truth is misguided. 
On some level, we all know that our dinner is but heated up 
dead things, but we don’t understand it that way. It isn’t only 
that it’s necessary to disavow what food is in order to eat com-
fortably; it’s also that we fail to understand a good meal if we 
don’t. What’s missing from the dead carcass description is a de-
scription of how we, as humans, value a good meal. A delicious 
meal isn’t something we’re only instinctively compelled to eat, 
but we view it as choice-worthy. We also want it. Similarly, sex 
is caught up in desire. It isn’t merely that we’re compelled to 
rub our genitals to the point of secretion. And lastly, it fol-
lows that this is why sublimating and devoting inordinate intel-
lectual energies to the study of sexuality is worthy of esteem. 
Gender and sexuality used to be my area. That was many 
years ago, and I’ve changed my focus since then. With the change 
came the habitual wondering about whether or not I had made a 
mistake. I was convinced I would eventually be doing important, 
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urgent work. Now that I don’t do anything explicitly politically 
usable, I’m not so convinced. 
The worry about whether or not we’re doing something 
choice-worthy isn’t an uncommon concern. It’s important that we 
do important work, but why? There are many professions that 
don’t carry with it this same burden. I’ve had my share of jobs 
in which I knew I was doing something not only useless, but per-
haps harmful to the species. Still, I was able to stay at these 
jobs because I was also able to hate them. Ideology worked just 
fine. I was content to think that though I’m doing something aw-
ful for a living, I’m still a person of integrity, for under-
neath the surface of polite professionalism and practical con-
cerns of rent, utilities, and food, I can’t stand that I’m mak-
ing life miserable for the working poor who, because of me, get 
their wages garnished for non-payment of medical bills. It was 
nice to be duped. Why, though, is a scholarly career something 
that one can’t merely approach as a job one does? 
One reason might be that many scholarly paths concern the 
examination of ideology. We’re thus denied ideology’s analgesic 
properties. In other words, we’re necessarily located in the 
also duped position of the “non-duped” who try to stand outside 
of ideology, duped because according to our own claims, there is 
no outside. To do what we do, we have to presuppose a meta-
ideological position. In other words, we’re forced to claim to 
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see beyond the already invisible veil that absolutely no one, 
regardless of perspicacity, can see through. Though we shouldn’t 
conflate ideology and the unconscious, we have something similar 
in psychoanalytic criticism, something that heavily influences 
my work. Namely, what approach does psychoanalytic criticism 
take with regard to its field of inquiry, the unconscious? The 
unconscious can’t be known. Here are teachings about it! 
This isn’t to disparage as futile the social sciences and 
the humanities writ large, nor is it to disparage the smaller 
subset of people who work within the body of knowledge gathered 
together under the rubric of psychoanalysis. What we have here 
isn’t a contradiction. You can fit the study of ideology or psy-
choanalysis into this model, but this is merely to be satisfied 
with the round peg that, given certain idiomatic conditions, 
necessarily fits into the square hole. I’ll have more to say on 
this later, but I think the scholar is instead in the position 
of one who never gives up. We are those willful individuals who 
keep trying when it’s a forgone conclusion that we can’t suc-
ceed. So how did Althusser unbind himself from his middle class 
position to write about ideology? He couldn’t, but he nonethe-
less wrote. Yes, so there’s this. 
But there’s another reason why a scholarly career isn’t 
something you can just do while representing it negatively to 
yourself all the way through. Colloquially speaking, we can’t 
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approach it with the same contempt as many other jobs because 
it’s necessarily a labor of love. Not as colloquially, what we 
generally know as lovingly laboring is what we also know through 
the psychoanalytic concept of sublimation. Sublimation has to do 
with esteem, thus our concern about the choice-worthiness of our 
paths within the profession. This, too, will be explained fur-
ther, but sublimation is the satisfaction of the drive through 
the inhibition of its aim. The drive doesn’t get caught up in 
the structure of desire in sublimation, so the question that a 
perfectly good neurotic would have—I say this only half jokingly 
because it’s actually different for the perverse subject and the 
psychotic—can have an answer. The neurotic can have an answer 
because the question of, Who am I for your desire? becomes re-
formulated. It becomes reformulated because the satisfaction of 
the drive displaces two things, and those are the subject itself 
and the desire of the Other. The question becomes, Is my work 
worthy of your esteem? When I’m sublimating, I know what you 
want. You want my work to be good. You want, in other words, 
valuable work. The answer to the question is either yes or no. 
This is why many of us in the social sciences and humani-
ties want our work to be politically efficacious. Having written 
that, I realize how contentious—and possibly smug sounding—a 
claim I’m making. In my defense, though, I’m not psychologizing. 
I don’t claim to know the inner, hidden workings of anyone’s 
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mind. That’s actually against what I take to be a major tenet of 
psychoanalysis. The unconscious is not directly knowable without 
distortions. In fact, its existence is only deduced because 
there are distortions in conscious discourse. I’m perhaps using 
the term want a bit to equivocatingly. I’m not saying there’s 
some part of us deep down that wishes our work to have political 
efficaciousness. Rather, I’m saying that we pursue this because 
we find ourselves forced into a position that makes our work 
subject to the evaluative criterion measuring political utility: 
Does your work just interpret the world? Because it needs to 
change it too! Otherwise, though your manuscript is carefully 
crafted, we wish you the best. 
From our most careful readers, we’re often posed with the 
question of, So what? As of late, we’ve generally tried to an-
swer this with, Because it’s important, important politically. I 
think—and I’m taking a cue from Badiou—that we’ve become sutured 
to the political as a truth procedure. Pursuing the truth 
through the political is necessary, but not sufficient. “The 
personal is political,” had been a useful slogan because it 
can’t literally be true. It had a jarring, dissonant overtone. 
It was a useful caution against not seeing the political where 
it was veiled, in these places that we wouldn’t otherwise think 
of as political, places such as the personal. Not everything we 
thought was non-political, that is to say, was actually so. 
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Still, we mustn’t go too far the other way. Critical activity 
for the scholar shouldn’t be reduced to finding the political in 
places where it isn’t. I’m claiming that there’s one area where 
it certainly cannot be. That area is comprised of the things 
composed of the drives. 
This, too, is a contentious claim. Let’s tease it out. 
First, desire is composed of the drives. Thus, I must hold it 
that desire is not political. In fact, I believe that if any-
thing, the political is influenced by desire, and not the other 
way around. Though I do talk about this later, it isn’t my fo-
cus. I bring it up because it helps to reinforce my claim that 
technology is not political, nor is the act of sublimating. 
These last two are major points I wish to make. 
At most, technology and the act of sublimating are social. 
They can involve groups of people and values shared by those 
people, but they are not, strictly speaking, political. I’m go-
ing by a narrow definition of the political. Namely, what I’m 
calling the political has to do with the polis. For me, perhaps 
surprisingly, matters of the polis only have to do with the 
State and governance secondarily. Primarily, the political—as 
I’m defining it—has to do with protecting the interests concern-
ing the biological life of a citizenry. I’m modifying a capa-
bilities approach somewhat. I’m modifying because I’m not con-
vinced that all the capabilities outlined by someone like Nuss-
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baum (2006) for instance, can be matters for the State. We might 
want the State to protect certain capabilities, but this might 
extend the State beyond what it can do. We extend thus when we 
try to make the State protect what we consider to be human 
flourishing, flourishing specific to the human. I feel confident 
that the State can protect the life of a citizenry insofar as 
the life that it protects is the biological life a citizen 
shares with all other forms of life. This isn’t the life that’s 
particularly human. The reason why I’m unconvinced about the 
State’s ability to protect human flourishing is that human 
flourishing doesn’t seem to be protectable in the first place. 
We may be able to ensure that the conditions necessary for human 
flourishing are protected, but the flourishing itself is a mat-
ter of willing. Willing cannot be protected because it can’t be 
threatened. All this shall be explained in detail later in the 
penultimate and ultimate chapters. But why are technology and 
the act of sublimating at most social and not political? 
If the political protects bios, or bare life, then technol-
ogy and the act of sublimating cannot be political because both 
concern life particular to the human. Further, the political 
tries to postpone death while technology and sublimating have an 
aim toward death. Technology and sublimating, then, are not po-
litical for two reasons. First, their orientations with regard 
to death are opposing vectors. Second, they involve different 
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types of death. The death involved in the political is a bio-
logical death. The death involved with technology and sublimat-
ing, things composed of the drives—which are all partial and 
death drives to begin with—have to do with death in the sym-
bolic. Death in the symbolic allows for immortality. What is the 
immortal? It isn’t necessarily just that which must only live, 
but it’s also that which can’t be killed. We might not be accus-
tomed to thinking of it in this way, but that which is already 
dead meets this latter criterion. You can never die twice, at 
least not in the same way. The symbolic allows for an existence 
that literally cannot die; something that comes to be symbolized 
becomes im-mortal because it becomes literal. In this way, to 
symbolize a thing is to kill it so that it cannot be killed 
again. 
Those are the differences, but what the political and that 
which is composed of the drives share is that both are only tra-
jectories, things that are marked out by vectors. Aims never get 
anywhere. Aims only point to a there. It’s the things travelling 
through trajectories that go places. Thus, political aims and 
the aims of drives qua aims never get anywhere either. If we’re 
talking about change in the world, we’re definitely not talking 
about what’s composed of the drives, but we’re also not talking 
about the political. This is what I feel is at the bottom of all 
the contentiousness of what I’m claiming: Though the political 
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doesn’t only interpret the world, it doesn’t change it either. 
It only gestures toward one. But I’ve introduced the end of this 
document. I’ve explained neither how we get to these conclu-
sions, nor have I mentioned what this document’s title seems to 
promise. 
 This is a document about networks, one that considers the 
scholar after the network and tries to answer the question, What 
ought we do? Scholars became esteemed for the rigor of their 
scholarship. To be called an ivory tower intellectual is an in-
sult, but to be called a coffeehouse intellectual is quite the 
opposite. We marvel at the well-read and their ability to draw 
surprising connections between texts. These are expert crafts-
people, those who’ve mastered the techne of scholarship. But, as 
with many technological innovations, comes a threat to the 
craftsperson. Technological innovations allow the amateur to 
produce results similar to the expert, and if this is so, why 
should we esteem the expert? Though photography didn’t make ex-
tinct realist painting, it did cause a crisis for it. Though it 
didn’t make the craft any easier to master or less amazing that 
one had, it made it far less valuable. What happens when the 
scholar’s efforts at mastery and mind is pitted against Google’s 
Google Books library and Google Scholar search engine? 
 One may prize something like handcrafted furniture, but not 
scholarship. I’m not going to get more esteem if I claim that 
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I’ve written this document without the use of the Internet or 
searchable databases. No one would want that, and I’ve used 
both. With the network comes a completely indexed library of in-
formation. The network is a concordance. It isn’t necessary to 
read as we once did to become an expert. To be an expert in any 
one field, one first had to become a voracious generalist. It 
was necessary to read in disparate areas to be sure that one 
wasn’t missing something. This is rigor. With the search engine, 
to become an expert in any one field, one only need to perform a 
database search for relevant texts. 
As someone who began scholarly pursuits at the border be-
tween the two eras, I remember having read tirelessly hoping to 
find the definition for imago. I found the word trying to read 
Lacan’s Ecrits. I reasoned that it must have had something to do 
with image, but felt that this was a specialized word. Diction-
aries didn’t help, and none of the countless secondary sources I 
read defined it. The journal titled American Imago was also a 
dead end. When I first got Internet at home, “imago” was one of 
the first things I looked up. There were no hits. But this was 
all long ago, a time when there was not even Google. I’m sure if 
I googled it today, I would find plenty. I won’t, this out of 
fidelity to my initial efforts. I still don’t know what the word 
means, and somehow to find out any other way than I had been at-
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tempting would feel like cheating. I’m lamenting something, but 
at the same time, I feel silly for doing so. 
 As scholars, we’re becoming more specialized because we 
have to be. I doubt very much that the academic market has be-
come less competitive. I will not make the prediction that it 
ever will be. We’ve always needed to be experts, but now that 
it’s no longer necessary to be well-rounded to be at one’s best 
in one’s area, it seems that the market encourages us not to be. 
I’m not saying that networked information gives us the luxury of 
reading less. We still need to read as much. What’s stolen is 
the luxury of reading broadly. There’s always too much to read, 
but now that too much is only in the area we’ve chosen. We’re 
responsible for that literature, and now we know how large a 
body of literature that is because all that literature is in-
dexed. The imperative of academic rigor compels us to read as 
much of that literature as possible. Because we can, we must! 
And we must specialize. 
 The coffeehouse intellectual is becoming extinct. If you 
ask me to substantiate that claim, I can’t. I can only point to 
the fact that I’ve not been able to find someone with broad 
knowledge at the café downstairs from my apartment, at least no 
one who’s younger than I. The people I know know what they know, 
and they know it well, but they don’t know much more. I should 
add that I’m including myself in the set of people I know. I 
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once had aspirations to drink more coffee, but alas, I’ve become 
Sartre’s absent Pierre. 
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Chapter 2: The Network, Intellectual Inquiry, and the Political 
 
I. THE POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL INQUIRY 
The political and intellectual inquiry had gone forth from 
network inefficiency. The network, inasmuch as it makes possible 
a certain type of making or doing, is now efficient. The network 
is approaching absolute realization of that which is most suited 
to it. And although the network is old, it’s approaching this 
realization only now because of electronic mediation. Not only 
does this approaching of network efficiency provoke a crisis for 
both the political and intellectual inquiry, but it curiously 
draws them together. 
First, the efficiency of the network is a limit where the 
political terminates. The network exceeds the governed, so the 
governed starts at the boundary of network inefficiency. Bounda-
ries, remember, can be either initial or final. Second, the eve-
ryday reality of intellectual inquiry was that it encountered 
the limit of knowledge not being fully networked. This limit of 
network inefficiency wasn’t, however, the point at which intel-
lectual inquiry stopped or encountered an impasse. It was the 
limit from which intellectual inquiry proceeded. Network effi-
ciency, then, pulls out the ground from which intellectual in-
quiry had built up. Network efficiency is the point where intel-
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lectual inquiry stops; it constitutes an everyday reality, but a 
new one. 
That the political and intellectual inquiry have the same 
initial boundary doesn’t mean that the two are overlapping tra-
jectories. Rather, the two proceed from that limit away from 
each other. Now, however, as they approach the limit of network 
efficiency, both are starting to come together insofar as 
they’re drawn to the same terminal limit. But this is to start 
at the end of the argument. We’ve much unpacking to do, so let’s 
begin with what we mean by the network. 
Being situated within the structure of the efficient net-
work might make us think we’re connected to the world, but the 
world is gigantic. Though we may have the potential to connect 
to an almost innumerable number of other nodes, on the level of 
the everyday, we tend to actualize only a nearly negligible 
fraction of that potential. What’s important about the efficient 
network is the potential it generates, not the actualization of 
that potential. In fact, that the network is efficient, that it 
makes possible these interactions, seems to make our drive to 
realize these potentials less pressing. It might be that we’ve 
realized that realizing these potentials isn’t something we 
wanted in the first place. 
Although digital aspects relating to the network may be 
something having only recently emerged, the network itself is 
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much older. Think, for instance, of roads. Roads are physical 
aspects relating to the network. Mail is yet another example. 
The network isn’t only what pertains to the electronically medi-
ated. Still, electronic mediations lend themselves well to the 
structuring of the efficient network. The speed at which elec-
tronic mediations occur verges on the immediate. Literally, the 
immediate is that which is without mediation. Heidegger (1988) 
gives us the definition of the immediate as the not yet mediated 
in his lecture Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Electronic me-
diations tend to efface themselves because of their speed. Mail 
traveling through roads, for instance, is slow. After email, 
it’s been renamed “snail mail.” As mediations, mail and the 
roads through which mail arrive make themselves salient. But 
though mediations affect the network, they aren’t necessarily 
what constitute the network. Bumpy roads and poor quality paper 
may affect some aspects of how the message is received, but they 
are not, for instance, the subpoena itself, for a subpoena is no 
more pleasant or unpleasant if it comes to you comfortably and 
is written on scented paper. It’s perhaps more accurate to say 
that mediations help the network come to its end and that they 
can better do so if they tend toward vanishing. So if mediations 
aren’t part of the network, what are? 
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II. THE NETWORK AS CONCORDANCE 
What’s constitutive of the network are indexes. The network 
is a structure, and what makes up that structure are codifica-
tions that point. Indexes are things that indicate. This can be 
opposed to signs from which one can derive meaning through in-
terpretation. The network doesn’t contain meaning, but only 
codes, indicators, things that provide directions when accessed. 
So if the only things in the network are indexes, the network is 
a concordance—a complete listing of indexes—for all networked 
objects. Let’s be clear, however, that networked objects them-
selves are not objects that make up the network, but objects in-
dexed by the network. They’re objects that have become unbound 
in the structure of the network because the network is a par-
ticular type of structuring. We should stress that the networked 
objects are in the network only insofar as they’re contained by 
the structure of the network, insofar as networked objects are 
within the purview of the network. They’re actually outside of 
the network if we’re thinking about an in-ness that’s constitu-
tive, for networked objects are not themselves constitutive of 
the structure, only their respective indexes are. This leads us 
to a more general caution when thinking about the network. The 
network is a structure, and a structure mustn’t be conflated 
with what it contains. Still, what do we gain by excluding the 
mediations and objects from the network? 
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We gain theoretical clarity about the how the network func-
tions. We must rethink theorizations of the network assert that 
nodes (objects), linkages (mediations), and interactions of 
nodes across linkages are what constitute the network. This 
overemphasizes the identity of the objects and their functions. 
What makes a node networked, or contained by the structure of 
the network, is that it’s accessible, that it has the potential 
to be accessed, and that it’s able to access other nodes. Fur-
ther, the linkages help allow this potential for the interaction 
of access. It’s the potential that’s important, not the actual-
ized accessing. We should instead emphasize what keeps the po-
tential in place: the fact that networked objects are things 
pointed to by indexes in the network. The network functions as a 
structure in the way that it does because it’s the concordance 
of all networked objects. The indexes make up the network, for 
what makes the network the network is potentiality. Potentiality 
is the essence of the network. And it is not that the potential-
ity ceases to be when it is realized.  As Agamben (1999) notes, 
something retains potential when it exhausts its impotentiality. 
Potentiality is retained here because the structure of the net-
work exhausts an impotentiality, the impotentiality that would 
otherwise bind objects in the network, the impotentiality that 
would otherwise make those objects inaccessible. 
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Further, if the network is a concordance, then it generates 
an archive. In the spirit of Michel Foucault (1982), let’s think 
of an archive not as the preserved and collected itself, but as 
a structure that confers upon objects the status of being pre-
served and collected. Because of this archive generated by the 
network, networked objects become caught up in a relationship to 
each other. All network objects share the quality of having be-
come indicated by an index in the network. Again, the network is 
the structure in which and because of which the networked object 
has become unbound. The network is what results from being net-
worked. But to be unbound or networked is not to be a node in-
teracting through linkages to other nodes. To be networked is to 
be unbound within a system because of that system. Further, this 
is claiming something different than that the network is bound-
less. 
We aren’t claiming that what’s characteristic of the net-
work is that it’s ever expansive, or that its principle charac-
teristic is that it is additive. This is to fall into the trap 
of a spurious infinity. It’s the spurious conception that some-
thing is infinite if we can forever add something to it. In the 
case of the network, we might be able to forever add one more 
node and connection, but this is not what makes the network in-
finite. What makes it infinite is the unbinding. The network is 
a structure in which things have become unbound. 
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III. UNBINDING 
When something is bound, it’s bound by something. It en-
counters a limit because of that something. Book pages encounter 
a limit because of the spine; the bondsman encounters a limit 
because of the lord; and the citizen encounters a limit because 
of the law. Further if a bound something isn’t bound by another 
thing, then it’s bound to its location. A thing cannot be bound 
by itself in the capacity of another thing, for that would be to 
assert that the thing is itself and something other than itself. 
In other words, a thing can only be said to be bound by itself 
if we think of binding in terms of encountering a limit. If 
something is to encounter the limit of nothing other than it-
self, then it can only encounter that limit because its exis-
tence is contained by a particular there. Something bound by 
nothing other than itself encounters the limit of its there. 
That something is bound to its location. In fact, all bound 
things are bound to their locations, whether that location be a 
physical space or a position in a system. At this point, we 
should make clear two things we are not claiming. 
First, though we are speaking of location, it should be 
evident that we are not theorizing movement within or through 
the network. While networks may indeed make possible the tra-
versal of space, what’s of interest isn’t the space itself. 
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Space can function as an impediment. What’s of interest is the 
binding that space can accomplish. When there’s a traversal of 
space in the network, there’s an unbinding. The object becomes 
no longer snared or impeded. Further, something like the declas-
sification of information also functions to unbind. With declas-
sification, information that had been bound by secrecy becomes 
unbound. The object becomes accessible or, as we say, networked. 
So with these two examples, we see that there are two things 
that unbinding in the network allows: 1. it allows an object 
contained in the network to become unbound from its location, 
and 2. it allows access to an object from other locations con-
tained in the network. But with all this talk of objects having 
become unbound, we should take care to not say that the objects 
have become freed, if only to avoid saying the network is some-
thing liberating. The network can be used for the act of liber-
ating, but it’s an agent, not the network who does the freeing. 
Second, because we are claiming that the network is the 
structure resulting from objects being networked, we must be 
claiming also that the network is not a governing structure, but 
a resultant one. Put a different way, the network isn’t some-
thing obeyed, but deduced. This leads us to the crisis that the 
efficient network—what we’ve just described—causes for the po-
litical. 
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IV. THE POLITICAL 
Prohibitions bind. For instance, were a governing entity to 
mark something as classified, this wouldn’t be to destroy that 
thing. It’s a binding prohibition. It binds whatever is classi-
fied to its location, for it cannot be accessed from other loca-
tions. Further, if a governing entity were to limit the usage of 
the index of a network, this is to bind the node attempting ac-
cess to its location. As we’ve noted networked objects must be 
unbound. Thus, to govern networked objects is to transform those 
objects into something else, to transform them into bound ob-
jects. This is to inject into these objects certain impoten-
tialities, and as we’ve seen, what’s important for the network 
is the exhaustion of impotentialities, to operate according to a 
fully realized potentiality. 
One might argue that this sort of binding exceeds the pur-
view of the government. Governing entities are meant to protect 
the life of its citizens and the rights belonging to those citi-
zens. With the exception of documents that would threaten na-
tional security or substances that endanger the public, one 
could argue that the networking of objects threatens neither the 
life of citizens nor their rights. The network merely indexes 
objects. Thus, to govern the network itself is to govern some-
thing nonthreatening. Governing should not be focused on the 
network, but on threatening objects. It’s true that threatening 
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objects can become indexed, or that indexing certain classes of 
objects can make them threatening, but what should be governed, 
with few exceptions, is the use or actualized access to such ob-
jects, not the indexing. Still, this is not the crisis that the 
government encounters with network efficiency. It isn’t only 
that the network necessarily exceeds the governable insofar as 
governing tends to diminish what is networked. What threatens 
governing entities is something different. 
Governing laws are codifications of the will of governance 
in the form of prohibitions. They can be transgressed. In fact, 
that what is willed can be transgressed is the reason that that 
will must become a governing law in the first place. Unchecked 
transgression of governing laws tends to weaken those laws. 
Thus, the will written into the governing law must transform 
those transgressing the law. Governing laws are what make possi-
ble this necessary transformation. The transformation transgres-
sors must be made to suffer is what we know as punishment. Sci-
entific laws too can be transgressed, but this does nothing to 
weaken the laws. However, that which transgresses a scientific 
law must undergo a transformation. We cannot will or enforce 
this transformation, but only deduce it. For instance, matter 
cannot be destroyed, but only transformed into another type of 
matter. Were matter ever to be destroyed, then that something 
having been destroyed must have undergone a transformation mak-
  
24 
ing it something other than matter. Scientific laws operate 
within the realm of deduction, not will. The law of the network 
is something that we describe according to something that looks 
more like a scientific law than a governing one. 
The concordance of indexes pertaining to network objects—in 
other words, the network—cannot be governed because governing 
can only be done in the presence of laws. Governing laws must 
have recourse to the signifier because there can be no prohibi-
tion without it, but the concordance doesn’t contain signifiers 
as such. The index may have been generated according to rules or 
laws, but those exist outside of the index. If one says that the 
rules are inscribed within the form of the index, then this is 
to conflate the container with the contained. The form of the 
index is outside of what it contains. It is merely the container 
of the index. The observable laws that apply to the index may 
have to do with combinatory limitations, but these are not rules 
insofar as there is no thing that obeys. That I can deduce some-
thing does not entail inscription. Inscription entails an inter-
pretive scheme by which the inscription came to be written. De-
duction requires the act of interpretation, but not that what 
was interpreted had been written. We deduce things about the 
network, but more importantly we deduce things from the network. 
We deduce locations from the indexes contained in the concor-
dance that is the network. It’s from here that we gain accessi-
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bility. This non-governable accessibility is the threat. That 
there is a structure that operates without recourse to the sig-
nifier is the terminal limit of governance. Governance cannot 
proceed beyond this point, and it’s for this reason that the ef-
ficient network causes panicked responses by governing entities. 
The U.S. Patriot Act is but one example. In other words, from 
the perspective of governing, there’s danger in the network in-
sofar as what cannot be governed poses a threat. The network is 
the container of the ungovernable. Thus, as the political en-
counters network efficiency, governance itself encounters its 
terminal limit. 
 
V. INTELLECTUAL INQUIRY 
But we said that intellectual inquiry encounters this limit 
also, and it so happens that this is a manifestation of what 
seeks to extend scholarship on the political. We should see what 
implications the efficient network has for scholarship concern-
ing the political, but let us explore intellectual inquiry first 
in more general terms. 
The adoption of technologies often involves the migration 
of human labor to machines. Poster (2006) implies that this mi-
gration cannot exist without political implications insofar as 
there is a mediation of relationships between the two. These 
technologies have their greatest impact when they become mun-
  
26 
dane, when our day to day tasks become so dependent upon them 
that for the most part, we forget we’re using them. With network 
efficiency, we have two new technological objects. We have the 
concordance of all networked objects and the archive that re-
sults from it. The concordance allows scholars to interact with 
existing bodies of knowledge, for objects of knowledge receive 
an address insofar as they’re indexed. Think, for instance, how 
the Internet has changed the way research is conducted. Moreo-
ver, with the coming of complete searchable libraries such as 
the one the Google Books Library Project seeks to create, all 
written text will become searchable. For the scholar, this would 
mean that a large part of scholarly labor will become migrated 
to the machine. The concordance constitutive of the network al-
lows us to access knowledge in a different way. It isn’t merely 
that it allows space to be traversed with greater speed, but 
memory becomes a prosthetic memory. The efficient network be-
comes a complete and searchable library in which knowledge be-
comes unbound. Scholars are encountering the limit of having ac-
cess to a networked library. 
The way scholars interface with the non-searchable library 
involves a certain amount of necessary ignorance. Many of the 
books we’ve read we’ve read without having known whether or not 
they’ll prove to be useful. We finish books with the hope that 
they’ll contain something of use, but we can never tell until we 
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finish them. Consequently, we end up finishing many books that 
we don’t find immediately useful, but still, we consider our-
selves better off for having read them—unless of course the book 
was bad, but in that case, it’s likely that we wouldn’t have 
finished it. Further, we happen upon many of these books by ac-
cident. They have interesting titles, or the dust jackets make 
the book seem promising, or the book is on a press we like. Or 
perhaps we’ve read a book review, or the book was cited in an-
other book, or we’ve been recommended that book by an acquain-
tance. In all cases such as these, we read the book with only a 
vague promise of usefulness. We must interface with books in a 
way that doesn’t allow us to know what we’re missing—or not 
missing—until we’ve read them. Our assessment of the book’s 
utility only comes after having finished it. If we start inter-
facing with the library via the network, then things become much 
different. 
With a networked library, we start with an interest, search 
that interest, and all the relevant networked objects come to be 
at our disposal inasmuch as we are able to access their loca-
tions. This is so, for we’re searching more than just subject 
headings and titles. We’re searching within the text itself. In-
stead of having a vague promise of usefulness, we start with a 
computer-mediated assessment of a text’s utility, and once we’ve 
decided upon its utility for ourselves, we proceed to read that 
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text. The technology of the search engine, an incarnation of the 
concordance of the network, seems to change our reading prac-
tices. Now, as scholars, we generally try to read everything 
that’s out there so we can have found everything that’s suited 
to our interest, and our interests often become shaped by our 
attempts to read everything we’re able. Still, the goal is to 
prune away the inessential, to establish a collection of the 
useful, to make our personal canon. If we have a search engine, 
our reading becomes more focused. We tend to become specialized. 
In Representations of the Intellectual, Said (1996) warns that, 
“Specialization means losing sight of the raw effort of con-
structing either art or knowledge; as a result you cannot view 
knowledge and art as choices and decisions, commitments and 
alignments, but only in terms of impersonal theories or method-
ologies” (p. 77). Less is left to accident, and the glut of what 
our searches return will leave little time to read anything 
else, for if we are still operating with the imperative of 
scholarly rigor—with the imperative of knowing everything that’s 
out there in our area—we become answerable to the question, Why 
haven’t you read this? We have no excuse not to have known about 
something if knowing about it only involves a search engine 
search. We’ll end up having less tolerance for ignorance—in both 
ourselves and others—but this intolerance will only enforce a 
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self perpetuating focus upon the interest with which we’ve be-
gun. 
With the imperative of rigor, to know all that which has 
already been known before proceeding in my goal to create some-
thing else to be known, then I am prohibited access to the un-
known by the searchable library of all texts. If there’s some-
thing I ought to do, I must first be able to do it. Thus, the 
imperative of rigor implies that I must know all there is to 
know about my object of inquiry before I proceed. However, I 
can’t know that I know all there is to know without having read 
all texts. Thus, I can only approach the ideal of rigor because 
I have no means by which to realize rigor in any practical way. 
Whereas I would’ve had to have read all texts in order to know 
what I had not known, the searchable library allows me to pro-
ceed efficiently. It makes knowing all there is to know about my 
object of inquiry within the realm of the possible. In other 
words, I don’t have to read the totality of all texts, only 
texts that are relevant to my object of inquiry. This will often 
prove to be a nearly impossible task, but it is not the abso-
lutely impossible task of reading everything. 
Mastery becomes impossible because the search technology 
makes it theoretically possible. Mostly, there’ll still be too 
much to read, only we’ll always know what we’re missing because 
all of the citations will have come up in the results of a 
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search engine query. Without search engine technology, however, 
mastery is possible because we go into the activity of attempt-
ing mastery with the foregone conclusion that mastery is impos-
sible. Here, though we never end up mastering that which was im-
possible anyway, we still accomplish a kind of mastery, albeit a 
different kind. We become well read. But perhaps this is too 
simplistic. If it is, it’s so at least partly for the reason 
that we begin with the premise that the good of doing research 
is only utility, that we acquire knowledge because it’s a means 
to some end. 
Speedy access may be beneficial to researchers working in 
the sciences or in technical fields, but while it may be true 
that the social scientist or humanities scholar has easier ac-
cess to scholarship, speed isn’t necessarily a benefit. It isn’t 
necessarily a benefit because in these disciplines, speed isn’t 
the highest value. I think it’s true that speed isn’t something 
that is necessary for either the social sciences or the humani-
ties. Speed is not something one thinks of along with social 
justice or the arts. We can’t think of the arts in terms of ef-
ficiency. Art is exactly what is inefficient. The arts have no 
use value. For issues of justice, and this is the more important 
point with regard to our argument, there is a sense of urgency. 
Speed and urgency are two different matters. Speed has a sense 
of efficiency; urgency is only timeliness. If we applied the no-
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tion of efficiency to justice, then we fall into a kind of 
utilitarianism. Our only concern becomes what is the most expe-
dient way to maximize the good. When we do this we end up treat-
ing certain classes of human beings as mere means. 
 
VI. CRISES 
In sum, the crisis that the efficient network causes for 
intellectual inquiry is that it migrates away from the scholar 
most of what constituted scholarly labor: becoming well read. 
Further, if we conflate the speediness that comes with the effi-
cient network with ideas of justice, we get into the mess of 
conflating efficiency with urgency. Political thought needs to 
come to a resolution because demands for justice are timely. If 
we must act, we must act quickly, yet with deliberateness, not 
with the facile utility of the efficient. This is something that 
ought to be reversed, especially if our intellectual inquiry 
takes the political as its object. 
There is a crisis for the intellectual. The intellectual is 
moving from being someone who retains great amounts of the li-
brary in their own memory. In fact, the intellectual has not 
been this person for quite some time. It could be that remember-
ing knowledge will be valued less and less for the reason that 
it will become more and more unnecessary with the everyday reli-
ance on the prosthetic memory achieved by an efficient network. 
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What would be valued more and more, it would seem, is the indi-
vidual who has the capacity to make the greatest use of the 
knowledge that is remembered for us. The assumption would even-
tually be that all the components are there, that most of what 
is to be known is already known in some way, and it’s just that 
these components need to be put together in novel ways when new 
problems arise. Truth as that which is revealed becomes an eas-
ier task in some senses. Searching becomes speedy whereas it 
once had been what occupied much of the scholars time. Without 
the complete and searchable library made possible by the effi-
cient network, searching would’ve involved the careful study 
which is becoming well read. Here, there would be a premium on 
creativity. The efficient network could thus be seen as a crisis 
centered around the parameters by which we establish intellectu-
alism. It wouldn’t be retained knowledge, but the refashioning 
of what is already in place. But is this what will happen, or 
are we missing some point? Is this too simple? 
We are missing the point of the importance of ignorance. 
Ignorance is the necessary ignoring of the knowable, and it re-
sults in a type of knowledge production that’s creative. It’s 
necessary to the practice of scholarship as we know it. That is, 
it’s necessary to what is creative in scholarship, that which 
proceeds from accident and mistake. This is what Hadot (1995) 
points out. There existed in Western philosophy the tendency to 
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believe that there were certain authoritative texts, usually 
around which a school of thought was built. Further, it was be-
lieved that, “Truth was contained within these texts; it was the 
property of their authors, as it was also the property of those 
groups who recognized the authority of these authors, and who 
were consequently the ‘heirs’ of this original truth” (p. 73). 
Thus, the task of philosophy was an exegetical one. Bad inter-
pretation is precisely what led to error. If we’ve moved away 
from this conception, and we believe that there is only misread-
ing, and creative misreading at that, might we not be returning 
to an older model of knowledge and knowledge production with the 
networked library? The fact that we would want to use it seems 
to belie that the truth is to be found in what is already known, 
and to create new truths, we must know what has already been 
known. This is the technological par excellence. It is the be-
lief that new knowledge is that which builds upon the old. But 
is there not a certain type of knowledge that can’t be built up, 
something that is other than the accumulation of techniques. 
There is a knowledge that is part of a creative—as opposed to 
productive—contemplative activity. 
When I am engaged in the act of contemplation, my experi-
ence is mediated by ignorance. Ignorance always exists insofar 
as it’s the necessary state in which there is an unknown not 
known. The possibility of knowing that a particular knowable 
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thing is not yet known rests on the impossibility of knowing all 
there is to know. Formulated a bit more clearly, I need to know 
everything before I know if and what, exactly, I don’t know. If 
ever there is something that I do not know—which is always—my 
thinking moves forward from the knowledge of there being a per-
petually not known. My thinking moves forward from this initial 
limit. And it’s from the not known that I create new thought. In 
other words, I generate something that is known from what is not 
known. It’s a creation ex nihilo. The unknown is the limit from 
which intellectual inquiry had begun, and it should continue to 
do so. That the networked library has come to be should not let 
us lose sight of this. The crisis is easy to avert if we recog-
nize this. 
Further, with everyday reliance on the prosthetic memory, 
it will be the case that creativity becomes valued over memory, 
then the original value of memory is being forgotten. What, ex-
actly, is being forgotten? What’s forgotten is the value of 
study as a good. Study isn’t an instrumental good for advancing 
the storehouse of knowledge that lies ready for our use, study 
is itself a good because it is part of human flourishing. Educa-
tion can indeed be instrumental, but it isn’t only instrumental. 
It is not that the efficient network can be educated for us, in 
our place. This is to take the good of human flourishing to be 
instrumental for development. Rather, we should be taking devel-
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opment as an instrumental good for human flourishing. Human 
flourishing itself isn’t development. Development is only a 
means to flourishing. To take it as an end is mistaken. But what 
do I mean by this? Often we think of a craft as the mere process 
that is a means to an end, and it’s the end that’s inherently 
more valuable. For instance, if I want a guitar, then I have an 
appreciation for the luthier because he or she is the craftsper-
son who constructs my guitar. I think, however, that we have an 
investment in inefficiency because at some level, we feel that 
knowing a craft and using it can be part of human flourishing. 
It is in this that technology—the efficient network—should not 
flourish for us. But what the point of this discussion? 
 
VII. CRISES RESOLUTION 
Study is the craft of the scholar. It is the process by 
which we commit things to memory. And though we have a technol-
ogy that can study for us, we ought not to neglect study because 
it is not simply a means to an end, this end being published 
scholarship. Rather, having studied, having committed things to 
memory, this thing that we generally call education is a good in 
and of itself because it is a component of human flourishing. 
This point seems rather obvious, but it still seems to be some-
thing that has been missed. We have evidence of this by the man-
date of scholarly publication, this mandate to produce novel re-
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search. Implicit in this mandate is that it is the published 
scholarship that we value, not the process of learning the craft 
of scholarship undergone by the scholar. To be blunt, no one 
cares if you’ve read and committed to memory everything there is 
in your area of study. No one would value “handmade” scholarship 
produced without a search engine. What is valued is that you 
produce something new in your field. Is this not the standard 
and quick way to reject a piece of scholarship submitted for 
publication: “You do not build upon existing research in this 
area”? True, one could say that to produce something new, to 
move the state of the art in a particular field forward, one 
needs to have read and committed to memory everything there is 
to know about that field. So it could be that education is in-
deed valued, but taken as a given. It is just that the require-
ment of producing something new is a high requirement. What is 
required in academe is that you master your craft, and you ad-
vance it. I grant that this is the strongest argument, but if 
this is so, that would mean that we are approaching a crisis. 
The crisis is that now novel research can be produced without 
the craft of education. This need not be a crisis if we re-
evaluate what we value. 
Resolving the problem for governance lies here as well. The 
crisis, as we have seen, is that governance cannot govern the 
efficient network, but why should it? Why must governance have 
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any relation to the network in the first place? The crisis is 
initiated because we’ve gotten into a political monism. Not eve-
rything is constituted from the political. Not everything needs 
to involve it. It’s true that we can look at much of the world 
through the lens of the political, but we needn’t do this. At 
bottom, to place a great amount of value in the political is not 
to insist that everything be politicized. The ungovernable is a 
threat to governance so long as governance is valued as the only 
thing that there is. 
And this is the curious drawing together of the political 
and intellectual inquiry. Intellectual inquiry does not realize 
its goal with efficiently accessible networked knowledge, for 
what this makes possible tends to diminish the value of educa-
tion, the actual target of intellectual inquiry. Education in-
volves a type of necessary ignorance. Education is not enhanced 
by speed. Intellectual inquiry must be aimed away from the effi-
cient network. Governance does not realize its goal by governing 
everything. It mustn’t try to subsume the efficient network, for 
ought implies can, and the network contains the ungovernable. 
Governance, too, must be aimed away from the efficient network. 
This isn’t to say that the efficient network needs to be de-
stroyed in order for both intellectual inquiry and governance to 
proceed, only that neither of them should try to encounter it 
and adapt to it. What resolves the crises is a move away from 
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adaptation to the network. Both should be aimed away from there 
terminal limit. Moreover, as we’ve discussed, the two should be 
aimed away from each other. Intellectual inquiry is aimed toward 
the contemplative, of creating from the unknown. The political 
is aimed toward action, toward the urgent. What, then, should we 
say about intellectual inquiry about the political, something in 
which this essay partakes? 
Recall that we had claimed that the initial limit from 
which both intellectual inquiry and the political proceeded 
forth was the inefficient network, that both had developed from 
this point. What is the inefficient network? It is the lack of 
network itself. A non-functioning network is not a network as 
such, but something that memorializes the ideal of network effi-
ciency. To say that intellectual inquiry and the political pro-
ceeded forth from this is to say that they proceeded forth from 
an ideal, from something only possible. Both began in the same 
place filling in what had not been achieved by the ideal of the 
efficient network, but each filled in what the other was unable 
to achieve. Thus, intellectual inquiry about the political bene-
fited the political insofar as intellectual inquiry itself 
doesn’t have the requirement of urgency. It has time to deliber-
ate, and this deliberation can be used for action. There’s no 
reason that intellectual inquiry should stop serving this func-
tion. Further, intellectuals are always of their time. Thus, the 
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political benefits intellectual inquiry insofar as when intel-
lectual inquiry takes up the political as its focus it grounds 
the thought of the intellectual in his or her time. There’s also 
no reason why this should stop being the case. 
In the next chapter, we will explore intellectual inquiry 
and it’s necessarily incomplete nature in more depth. Namely, we 
will explore the scholar’s relation to books. We’ll have some 
help from Walter Benjamin, a scholar whose fascination with 
books is evident from his often fragmentary work. 
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Chapter 3: Books and the Library 
 
I. THE ADDRESS 
There’s a vignette that I’ve been reading over and over in 
what’s considered to be the final version of Berlin Childhood 
around 1900. It’s titled “Boys’ Books”.  
“My favorites,” Benjamin writes, “came from the school 
library. They were distributed in the lower classes. The 
teacher would call my name, and the book then made its way 
from bench to bench; one boy passed it on to another, or 
else it traveled over the heads until it came to rest with 
me, the student who had raised his hand. Its pages bore 
traces of the fingers that had turned them” (Benjamin, 
2006, p. 58). 
There’s a fitting description here of information transmis-
sion, one that we might apply to the notion of network. It’s 
only after the boy is addressed by the teacher that the book 
makes its way to him via the mechanism of tiny hands. The net-
work facilitates transmission because it makes use of the ad-
dress. Places are pointed out and named. 
What I find more interesting, though, is the last sentence I 
quoted: “Its pages bore the traces of the fingers that had 
turned them.” We might assume that these traces are not actual 
fingerprints, ones made, let’s say, from the residual stickiness 
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of ein Berliner, the pastry. Because this is around 1900, we 
might guess that Benjamin is referring to page yellowing. Acid-
free paper, of course, wasn’t commonly used for book printing 
until the time around my childhood, the 1970s, and one reason 
why the older paper yellows is that it reacts to the oils on 
your fingers. Fingerprints tell you who touched what, but yel-
lowing only tells you that the book was touched, that its pages 
were turned. I believe this might tell us something about what 
happens to intellectual inquiry when the network becomes fully 
efficient. 
The passage quoted above, as I mentioned, is from the final 
version of Berlin Childhood. It’s presumably a revision or a re-
placement of the vignette from the 1932-34 version, “School Li-
brary”. At first glance, Benjamin’s tone seems different: 
It was during recess that the books were collected and then 
redistributed to applicants. I was not always nimble enough 
on this occasion. Often I would look on as coveted volumes 
fell into the hands of those who could not possibly 
appreciate them. (Benjamin, 2006, p. 143) 
This is a description of stolen of enjoyment. It’s young Walter 
who has the wherewithal to appreciate these books, yet they fall 
into the hands of his philistine peers. In the final version, 
there isn’t a blatant dismissal of his peers’ abilities, yet we 
might unveil a similarity if we compare the two closely. Notice 
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that in the final version the pages are “turned”. This doesn’t 
mean, necessarily, that they were read. If we take both passages 
together, then there’s some worry over stolen enjoyment, but in 
the final version, it is an indeterminate other, an unaddress-
able other who turns pages. And it is precisely this idea that 
I’d like to explore with regard to what might happen to intel-
lectual inquiry: What is being stolen from the practice of in-
tellectual inquiry with the coming of the infinite library of 
the network? 
 
II. THE INDEX OF THE WORLD 
Technologies have their greatest impact when they become mun-
dane. I use the term mundane here deliberately. In other words, 
technologies have their greatest impact not only when they are 
everyday, but when they become of the world. Though the two are 
distinct, when we think of the network we should also say some-
thing about globalization. We might think of globalization as 
that which is world forming, and we find ourselves in a world 
that will have been formed in a particular way, a world that is, 
as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it in The Creation of the World or Glob-
alization, “the common place of a totality of places” (Nancy, 
2007, p. 42). We find ourselves in a world that will have been 
made by an efficient network. And as we shall see, the network 
is about places, places that have been given an address. The to-
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talized entity of places to which we refer as the “global” is 
not possible without the network.  
What’s important about the network is the potential it gener-
ates, not the actualization of that potential. We may feel as 
though the world is getting smaller, but it’s still gigantic. 
What we’re actually experiencing isn’t a shrinking of the world, 
but the growing accessibility of things located in the world of 
the network. If one isn’t convinced, imagine if we were to surf 
all websites, mail parcels to all addresses, and go everywhere 
marked out by a map. Though the network is massive, not all 
nodes and connections are continuously accessed. This would mean 
that the size of the world would be in a perpetual flux tied to 
activity only, not countable places. The world does not only 
consist of what nodes are interacting at any one moment through 
particular connections. What is massive about the network is the 
collection of what’s indexed, what’s pointed to, what has an ad-
dress. If the network has become so massive that it has created 
the world, then that network is efficient. It is efficient in 
terms of being a causa efficiens.  
The network creates the world by its gathering together of 
things to which it gives an address, through indexing. Because 
the network creates the world through indexing, we can better 
understand the concept of network through a particular part of 
the network in which the index is the most salient: the infinite 
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library of the network. Though it doesn’t yet exist, this net-
worked library would be totalized and searchable. It would be 
the size of the world of written texts and would be fully in-
dexed. It would be a totalized textual archive retroactively 
created by a concordance—or exhaustive index—of that archive.  
 
III. THE SET OF BOOKS 
At this point, not all books are searchable. The technology 
exists, however, to make this so. Libraries can be digitally 
scanned, archived, and fully indexed in a search engine. In the 
efficient network, recorded information itself becomes a total-
ized and searchable library in which knowledge becomes unbound. 
The efficient network gives us an infinite library. But what is 
an infinite library? 
One way to think about a library is to think about it as a set 
of books. To think about a complete library would be to think 
about a library that contains the set of all books. But what 
does it mean to think of an infinite library? On the one hand, 
the answer might seem to be a simple one. An infinite library 
would be one that contains an infinite amount of books. But here 
already, the simplicity of the answer starts to break down. We 
know that this isn’t possible, for to contain an infinite amount 
would be self-contradictory. As we have already pointed out, 
what is infinite is by definition without bounds, so it can’t be 
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the case that an infinite number of anything can be contained, 
for to contain something implies that there are boundaries. So 
within the realm of possibility—both conceptual and material—an 
infinite library would seem to be one that would always allow 
the addition of one more book. It would be a conception of a li-
brary that involves a set that isn’t closeable insofar as that 
set of books cannot contain the last book. In some sense, this 
is what we have already. The medium—paper, digital, or other-
wise—doesn’t matter so much. 
True, digital libraries seem to lend themselves better to the 
realization of this type of library than do paper libraries only 
because paper libraries take up more space, have to be main-
tained, staffed, etc. It isn’t impossible, though, to have this 
type of paper library; it’s only difficult to realize. Further, 
electronic libraries seem to be infinite insofar as the number 
of copies of individual books is not finite. It doesn’t contain 
duplicate copies of books, in fact. Duplicate copies are gener-
ated within the point of access—a personal computer, let’s say—
and there can be as many copies of a particular title as there 
are points of access. For instance, a library may have ten cop-
ies of a certain title, but when those ten are charged, to 
charge an eleventh book would involve some patience on the part 
of the prospective borrower. With an electronic library, the 
only limits to the amount of copies that can be charged are how 
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many points of access exist, but this isn’t a limitation of the 
library itself. The points of access—are mere nodes, something 
we are taking to be different from the infinite library of the 
network.  
Further, it would seem that there isn’t anything that stops us 
from writing yet another book. So long as there’s some medium 
upon which and time during which to write, provided there is a 
place for it, we can always add one more book to the collection 
of books that have been written already. And though it may some-
day contain all texts, the infinite library is frozen in incom-
pleteness. It is a perfected or finished incompleteness, some-
thing which might seem counterintuitive, but we’ll explain this 
below. This, I think is an important point, the point that with 
our current conception of the library in general, there’s no 
such thing as a last book. With the infinite library of the net-
work, it isn’t a necessary condition that there be a last book, 
nor is there a promise of a last book. Rather, there’s a promise 
that there will be no last book, but not because there will al-
ways be more books to write and index. There can be no last 
book, for there are no books in the library of the network. 
Let’s clarify. The infinite library of the network is created 
by the index of the network. It’s something that’s merely gath-
ered together by the index. The network, being only the struc-
ture created by an index, cannot contain the actual books. It’s 
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the library—taken merely as a set of books—that would contain 
the books. However, we aren’t talking of just any library. The 
library of the network, insofar as it results from the network’s 
index, is different. It’s different, for that which is indexed 
becomes transformed. Remember, it isn’t only book titles that 
are indexed by the network, but all text. With the coming of the 
infinite library of the network, we have a concordance for all 
public text. For this reason, it’s a library that can’t be un-
packed.  
 
IV. THE INCOMPLETE 
Benjamin’s essay “Unpacking My Library” is a poignant one for 
the bibliophile. Property and possession do indeed belong to the 
tactile sphere, and it isn’t difficult to agree that collectors 
are people with a tactile instinct. True, some of his descrip-
tions may be rare occurrences nowadays. We may no longer be dis-
covering cities, for example, by searching for books in station-
ary stores or antique shops. Nonetheless, there’s something 
about holding a book in one’s hand and owning it. And this might 
be why one can feel so threatened by the library of the network. 
Might we feel threatened by the prospect of no longer having ac-
tual books, by the prospect of having no libraries to unpack? 
Yes, it could be this threat to the tactile, to the materiality 
of books, but this seems to be only half of the story. I think 
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there’s something else going on that’s parallel. Benjamin’s last 
sentence in the penultimate paragraph is this: “Only in extinc-
tion is the collector comprehended” (Benjamin, 2005, p. 492). 
Similar to this, I think what could possibly be anxiety produc-
ing about library of the network is that the possibility of the 
extinction of the book is forcing us to comprehend the non-
material concept of the book itself. But before we get into this 
description of the book, we should attempt to address who this 
collector is, precisely. To understand the collector, we must 
understand the notion of collecting, and the paired notions of 
incompleteness and completeness. Let’s again look to Benjamin: 
What is decisive in collecting is that the object is 
detached from all its original functions in order to enter 
into the closest conceivable relation to things of the same 
kind. This relation is the diametric opposite of any 
utility, and falls into the peculiar category of 
completeness. What is this “Completeness”? It is a grand 
attempt to overcome the wholly irrational character of the 
object’s mere presence at hand through its integration into 
a new, expressly devised historical system: the collection. 
(Benjamin, 2002a, pp. 204-5) 
It’s somewhat ironic that the passage above comes from Benja-
min’s great, incompleted work, The Arcades Project. Still, it 
gives us a good description of collecting. It’s the process of 
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removing an object from the realm of its utility and placing it 
into relation with things of the same kind, placing it into the 
category of completeness.  
What’s more ironic, we might point out, is that to someone 
like a book collector, the most collectible items are precisely 
the ones that can’t be collected, at least in the sense of a 
gathering together of like objects. To the collector in general, 
the most collectible are the items that are one of a kind. In 
classified ads, for instance, we see descriptions like, “Only of 
its kind, a rare collectible.” So what makes the non-collectible 
collectible so precious? The attribution of preciousness might 
be explained as something that’s on the brink of the anxiety 
provoking. 
Anxiety is an affect responding to loss. In particular, it’s a 
response to the loss of loss itself. In other words, anxiety ap-
pears when where there should be a loss, there’s instead some-
thing like an object. Loss applies to something that had been 
but is no longer. And from this we see that it can’t be the lack 
of a loss. It isn’t that loss was never there. Rather it’s the 
case that there had been loss, but that loss is no longer. One 
is forced back into a wholeness that should not be. And here we 
get back to why the precious is on the brink of the anxiety pro-
voking. 
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The precious, non-collectible collectible is an object that 
appears in the midst of loss. Something that is not isn’t in the 
midst of anything. If something doesn’t exist and never has, 
then we have no context for it. As in the quote from Benjamin 
above, there would be no “expressly devised historical system”, 
for what is context but this historical system? The fact that 
the non-collectible collectible is one of a kind puts it in the 
context of a possible abundance. It creates this historical sys-
tem, but can only fill it with one item. The non-collectible’s 
collectibleness implies that there should be a number of these 
items to be gathered together, but the fact that there’s only 
one imposes the constraint of can on that should. Thus, the one 
of a kind item is always in need of others. It becomes the most 
collectible for the very reason that the act of gathering to-
gether cannot be completed. The reasoning behind this being that 
if something is collectible and one has finished collecting, 
then upon finishing the act of collection, there’s nothing “-
ible” about it. The completed action of collecting results not 
in collectibility, but in the having of a collection. What we 
see, then, is that the most collectible item belongs to the in-
completed, for there is no gathering together in the presence of 
only one. But what does it mean to be incomplete? 
We can start to answer the question by referring to its oppo-
site: completeness. That which is completed is that which, most 
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generally, has come to an end. So completedness is always some-
thing that exists in a perfected state, whether past and pre-
sent, or future perfect. It’s something that’s come to an end 
and remains having done so, or it’s something that will have 
come to an end eventually. The incomplete, then, would seem to 
be that which could never exist in a perfected state. One might 
argue that there’s no sense in which something can be “incom-
pleted”, for if incompletion were to become perfected, that 
would only mean that it would pass over into completion. But is 
this so? Is it possible that something can indeed be incom-
pleted? 
 If we start something that has no possibility of finishing, 
then might we not say that its incompleteness exists in a per-
fected state? It is comparable to the reading of Benjamin’s Ar-
cades Project, for instance. We can never finish reading it be-
cause Benjamin was never finished writing it. It is something 
that is perpetually incomplete, and it will remain so. After 
all, this is what it means to be perfected: for something to re-
main perpetually what it has become once it has passed into a 
certain state of existence. In this sense can something be in-
completed. 
Globalization is the same. We might speak of the global inso-
far as we have entered a stage in which the making of the world 
is frozen in this incompletion. Might we not say that to impose 
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a structure upon something—a structure such as the one formed by 
the index of the network—is at the same time to impose upon that 
thing incompleteness. Structures are always formed around a ne-
gation, for things only come to be determinate through negation. 
But with the very structuring through negation, we are forced to 
deal with the negation of negation itself, and as such, this is 
that which cannot be absorbed by the structure. This is the very 
outside of structure that can never become determinate. And if 
all things that are determinate can come to be symbolized—if 
something is determinate, then we can have a name for it—then 
the negation of negation is that which resists being written, 
spoken, or gestured toward. The negation of negation would be 
everything as indeterminate. It would be everything as an indi-
visible something, for if negation is not, then nothing can be 
divided. Division only exists through negation. True, we can 
give a name to the state of affairs that exists because of the 
negation of negation. But this is only to name the state of af-
fairs itself. What the negation of negation entails is that 
nothing within that state of affairs is namable. Whether that 
state of affairs is namable or not is inconsequential, for we 
are naming that state of affairs from the outside, not from 
within it. So at bottom, what we are acknowledging is that when 
we impose a structure upon the world, we introduce at the same 
time that which resists structure. This is the global. Put an-
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other way, when we make things determinate through the process 
of negation, we introduce the possibility of the negation of ne-
gation itself, something that leaves us with everything as inde-
terminate. Still, let’s return to the library. 
When we introduce an order to the library, we introduce along 
with it a boundary. The idea of order makes it necessary for 
there to be a set that can be ordered and that that set to con-
tain more than one member. The members of this set are books. 
But the stipulation that there be more than one member to this 
set, a stipulation made necessary by the requirement of order 
sets a limit. Though it doesn’t impose a limit on the side of a 
progression—there can always be one more book—it does impose a 
limit on the side of inception. There’s a limit on the side that 
one must begin with at least two of something. Thus, the first 
of the set is equal to two. Order cannot be made within a set 
wherein division is not possible, in a set that must consist of 
one and only one. Thus, any ordered library is finite. And, 
again, I do not mean by order a system of organization. It isn’t 
as though alphabetizing or imposing a system of categorization 
by subject matter makes a library finite. Rather, what I’m sug-
gesting is that the requirement that order imposes of there be-
ing at least two is what makes a library finite. Thus, an infi-
nite library that’s always infinite in and of itself—infinite 
without partaking in the spurious infinity of always one more—is 
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one that isn’t bound to the rule of divisibility. An infinite 
library is one wherein division doesn’t exist. An infinite li-
brary is a set that consists always only of one. But what would 
this mean? It would mean that we don’t think about the library 
as a set of books, but as a set that contains one member. It is 
at this point that we can return to our question about the ex-
tinction of the book. 
In “School Library”, Benjamin describes his experience of the 
assigned readers as this: “I had to remain confined within par-
ticular stories, as if within barracks that—even before the ti-
tle page—bore a number over the doorway” (Benjamin, 2006, p. 
143). There’s something binding about this description of the 
book, and we might supplement this idea with what Jacques Der-
rida puts forth in Paper Machine. It’s the idea of a gathering 
together that’s the book’s most salient quality. A book is a 
gathering together under a title, a title bearing the book’s 
name, its identity, its legitimacy, its copyright. This gather-
ing together extends to the library, the gathering together of a 
store of books (Derrida, 2005, pp. 6-7). But, Derrida asks, 
might we still call a library that which no longer gathers to-
gether this store of books? For what would be a gathering to-
gether of texts with no paper support, electronic texts that are 
not finite, that may be open textual processes over global net-
works, texts that may be actively or interactively co-authored 
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by readers? Could it be that the book as we know it has no fu-
ture, or that if it has a future, it will no longer be what it 
was? Could it be that we’re awaiting this other book that will 
rescue the book from what is now happening? And what of this 
book to come, a book whose past has not yet reached us, but 
whose past we nonetheless must think about? Might we not say 
that the library of the network is exactly what is this book to 
come? Ideally, it’s a gathering together of the totality of all 
books that at the same time creates a dispersion, a dispersion 
because its searchability has no respect for titles, or that 
which is the delimiter of the book qua book. 
So here we have thus far had two descriptions of books, one 
from Benjamin and the other from Benjamin as supplemented by 
Derrida. The book is that tactile object that one can possess 
and at the same time an abstract something gathered together un-
der a title. With both descriptions, the book can be collected 
in a library, but one is the private library of a collector, a 
library that can be unpacked. In the other description, the book 
belongs to a public library that has the potential to contain 
everything in a way that can’t be unpacked. In the literal 
sense, the library of network can’t be unpacked. It’s a unified 
whole; other than orthographical symbols, there are no discrete 
units as far as the searching is concerned. Figuratively, this 
library belongs to no one in particular, so there’s no one to do 
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the unpacking. The book collector ceases to exist, becomes ex-
tinct as Benjamin might say, and this is so not only because 
there is no need to gather together books, but because the li-
brary has moved away from the model in which books are members 
of a set that constitutes the library. Rather, through the com-
ing of the library of the network, the conception of the library 
has shifted to the totality of the published, to the totality of 
publicly readable text. It is precisely in this way that the li-
brary becomes infinite. It becomes a set that can only have one 
member. It is infinite insofar as that one member necessarily no 
longer retains divisions. True, the member of that set is in 
perpetual flux. It does indeed change every time more text is 
added to it. Still, it remains the totality of all that has been 
published, only it gets bigger with each indexed addition. But 
we again return to the book collector. We have explained col-
lecting in general, but who is this threatened collector? 
 
V. THE SCHOLAR AS COLLECTOR 
Though the practice of intellectual inquiry is not limited to 
the scholar, it’s the labor most appropriate for the scholar. It 
stands to reason, then, that it’s the scholar who is most af-
fected by a change in the means of intellectual inquiry, a 
change that will come from the existence of a totalizing and 
searchable library. For the scholar, this would mean that a 
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large part of scholarly labor will become migrated to the ma-
chine. Interfacing with a digital library through a search en-
gine would allow us to access knowledge in a different way. It 
isn’t merely that it allows space to be traversed with greater 
speed, but memory becomes a prosthetic memory. If anyone can be 
as smart as they are able to use a search engine, might this be 
the extinction of the scholar? Will the intellectual be anyone 
with access to the network? Is this how we will comprehend the 
scholar, only after the scholar becomes outmoded? But perhaps 
the scholar is not the same as this collector. Consider what 
Benjamin says of the historian Eduard Fuchs: 
From the outset, he was not meant to be a scholar. Nor did 
he ever become a scholarly ‘type,’ despite the great 
learning that informs his later work. His efforts 
constantly extended beyond the horizon of the researcher. 
(Benjamin, 2002b, p. 263) 
If what made Fuchs not be the scholarly type was what extended 
him beyond the horizon of the researcher, then might this not be 
the act of collecting? This isn’t the archival collecting that 
creates what Nietzsche called the “historical malady.” Fuchs is 
clearly not this type of historian, but a collector of a differ-
ent sort. Perhaps the scholar can evade extinction by becoming 
this other type of collector. Perhaps it’s the case that the 
scholar who is threatened with extinction wasn’t a collector in 
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this sense to begin with. Perhaps the archival collector should 
indeed face extinction. With the coming of the infinite library 
of the network, there is no need to esteem this type of collect-
ing. It is no longer socially useful. What we should esteem in 
scholars is something different. Now, as scholars, we generally 
try to read as much as we possibly can, so we can have found 
everything that’s suited to our interest, and our interests of-
ten become shaped by our attempts to read everything we’re able. 
Still, the goal should be to prune away the inessential, to 
establish a collection of the useful, to make our personal 
canon. Consider what Benjamin writes about the book in One Way 
Street. 
And today the book is already, as the present mode of 
scholarly production demonstrates, an outdated mediation 
between two different filing systems. For everything that 
matters is to be found in the card box of the researcher 
who wrote it, and the scholar studying it assimilates it 
into his own card index. (Benjamin, 2004, p. 456) 
This is what the scholar as collector accomplishes. The good 
scholar who is also a collector collects such a “card box” and 
transcends the book. It is in this way that we can transcend be-
ing the type of archival collecting that we might associate with 
scholarship. If the book is but an outdated mediation, perhaps 
the mediation of the infinite library of the network should re-
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main precisely that: a mediation. The scholar in general needs 
not face extinction because the network is but an in-between 
that should for the most part vanish. The network doesn’t 
threaten to wipe out the scholar. Rather, it facilitates the 
creation of scholars. But this isn’t to say that the network is 
a genie granting us genius. Genius must be protected. Certain 
uses of the network can threaten genius, in fact. 
With the networked library, all knowledge exists as an acces-
sible totality at once, and although this has always been the 
case, it hasn’t been practicably accessible because of igno-
rance. Ignorance as a mediator doesn’t usually vanish. Not know-
ing that a text exists doesn’t allow for a true synchrony. How-
ever, with the networked library, ignorance does tend to vanish. 
Knowledge becomes immediate insofar as it’s no longer mediated 
by ignorance. Nothing is lost because it can be searched elec-
tronically. This is how there is the loss of lack in the infi-
nite library of the network. It is herein that the anxiety lies. 
So what we might see, then, is that genius has thus far pro-
ceeded from ignorance and aimlessness. Again, we might find 
resonances with this in a quotation from The Arcades Project: 
Basic to flânerie, among other things is the idea that the 
fruits of idleness are more precious than the fruits of 
labor… Most men of genius were great flâneurs—but 
industrious, productive flâneurs. (Benjamin, 2002a, p. 453) 
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Like the strolling flâneur, we must read industriously, but 
resist the mechanistic systemization that can come with certain 
usages of the infinite, networked library. We must continue to 
be scholars, but resist that position as a position resulting 
from the division of labor. True, we are subjected to this labor 
and may find ourselves alienated in it by the requirements of 
rigor, but we must approach intellectual inquiry as a labor of 
love. We may be able to enjoy a certain amount of ease with the 
infinite library of the network, but this is an enjoyment we 
must refuse. We must learn to say no to this enjoyment. Let’s 
return to that vignette I’ve been reading over and over, the one 
titled “Boys’ Books”. Here’s the beginning of the ending para-
graph: 
Or is it with older, irrecoverable volumes that my heart 
has kept faith? With those marvelous ones, that is, which 
were given me to revisit only once, in a dream? What were 
they called? I knew only that it was those long-vanished 
volumes that I had never been able to find again. 
(Benjamin, 2006, p. 60) 
There’s something about keeping faith with that to which we 
must have a relation of not knowing. Certain usages of the infi-
nite networked library threaten to rob us of this not knowing. 
It is not so that because we can enjoy something, we must. For 
it’s an enjoyment of ease afforded to us by the infinite library 
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of the network that steals the enjoyment of discovery, a discov-
ering enjoyment that reproduces itself, an enjoyment like that 
of when we were children reading at a time when we “still made 
up stories in bed” (Benjamin, 2004, p. 464). What is lost is a 
loss similar to the “I don’t know” of childhood. We might try to 
retain an enjoyment of the library similar to that of what Ben-
jamin describes of Karl Hobrecker, a collector of children’s 
books: “That childlike pleasure is the origin of his library, 
and every such collection must have something of the same spirit 
if it is to thrive” (Benjamin, 2004, p. 406). The infinite li-
brary of the network can turn the pages for us, and it can do 
this even before we get to read them. Still, we must yearn to 
grasp these books for ourselves, though we may often not be nim-
ble enough to do so. 
As we’ve seen, the most collectible items aren’t collectible 
in the sense that we can gather them together. The most col-
lectible are one of a kind. With the library of the network, we 
already know beforehand that an abundance is lost. When every-
thing is unveiled with the searchability of the infinite library 
of the network, what’s lost in abundance is the ignorance of not 
knowing what’s out there. What’s lost is the abundance of poten-
tial discovery. What becomes most collectible, what becomes one 
of a kind, then, are our strolls as scholars, as intellectuals. 
For there’s still something that can’t be gathered together by 
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the index of the network, and that’s the particular path we 
stroll. A stroll is movement, and because movement isn’t divisi-
ble, it can’t be gathered. It can’t, in other words, be indexed. 
Strolling resists the network. We must now learn how to move 
boundlessly in this way through the boundless networked library. 
It’s only by means of such singular movement through knowledge 
that we can have a relationship to the oppressive wholeness of 
totalized knowledge and remain scholars. 
To have mapped the world is not to move through it. To appre-
hend the globe with the view of the gods is not to see it as the 
human traveling on foot. This is what must remain. We cannot al-
low the network to steal our intellectual wanderings. The infi-
nite library of the network should merely give us a bigger city, 
not an itinerary. 
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Chapter 4: Technology and the Political 
 
I. IS TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESSION A MOVEMENT? 
What is technological progression? Progress contains within it 
the idea of advancement, but with regard to technology, is there 
indeed this type of movement forward? With this question we 
might ask from what are we moving and also toward what. How we 
might answer these questions depends upon what we think of as 
the end of technology, and this is assuming that we take it for 
granted that technology does indeed have an end. Still, if there 
is this type of movement, technological progression would cer-
tainly not be linear. Technological practices converge with 
other practices that are also in states of development, and it 
isn’t as though all technological practices keep pace with one 
another. The state of development of certain practices might 
hold other practices back, for instance, and with these inter-
sections, it would be difficult to argue that technological pro-
gression has an absolutely linear trajectory. Still, one might 
argue that though it proceeds in fits and starts, technology 
does have an overall movement, and it’s one that moves forward. 
After all, even if I’ve pushed around a cinder block erratically 
and in circles from here to there, one can still plot a dis-
placement vector provided that the block isn’t in same place as 
when I started. From the standpoint of physics, I’ve done some 
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work. It doesn’t matter how circuitous I may or may not have 
been. To make an analogy with technology, it might not matter 
that we’ve sometimes gone backward after having gone forward and 
that not all practices kept pace with the others, for overall, 
there’s progress. 
 Though this might seem like a reasonable way to think about 
technological progression, I’d like to suggest that it’s more 
useful to think in terms that don’t involve movement at all. In 
this way, we wouldn’t need to question from what and toward what 
when we think of technology’s progress. Rather, the question 
would be one purely of value. What I’m suggesting is that tech-
nological progression is indeed a trajectory, but not a develop-
mental one. I’m suggesting that technological progression cannot 
be developmental as such because technology itself has no end. 
Rather, technology is only an aim, is purely an aim. As such, 
technological progression is not an instrumental good. But why 
do I think technological progression isn’t best thought of as 
movement? 
Technological progression isn’t best thought of as a move-
ment insofar as movement is indivisible. At least this is how 
Bergson (1991) explains it. “Every movement,” he says, “inasmuch 
as it is a passage from rest to rest, is absolutely indivisible” 
(p. 188). He gives the example of moving one’s hand from point A 
to point B. One can perceive this movement as a traversal of 
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space, and space can be divided indefinitely. So one might also 
think movement to be divisible. However, this is to confuse the 
divisible space with the indivisible movement. And when consid-
ering Zeno’s paradox in, this is exactly what Bergson (2001) 
warns against. Achilles never passes the tortoise in the paradox 
insofar as the indefinitely divisible space is confused for two 
motions that are separate and indivisible. So what does it mean 
to say that technological progression isn’t movement? It’s to 
say that it isn’t a continual something. It’s to say that tech-
nological progression is divided. But let’s be concrete and take 
as an example the inventions of the mechanical typewriter and 
the word processing computer. It isn’t that we’ve gone from the 
mechanical typewriter to the computer in one indivisible move-
ment. Rather, kinds of typewriters have come and gone as have 
different kinds of computers, and the comings and goings of both 
types of writing technology have overlapped each other. In other 
words, it isn’t as though we used the mechanical typewriter, in-
vented the electric typewriter and stopped using mechanical 
typewrites altogether, and so on until we get to the computer. 
It isn’t as though the typewriter is point A and the computer 
point B and everything in between is what constitutes techno-
logical progression. Technological progression is better thought 
of as characterized by events. To use the writing technology ex-
ample, the invention of the typewriter is one event, the inven-
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tion of the computer another event, and the differences between 
the knowledge memorialized in the production of these two things 
is technological progression. What occurs between these two 
events are differences in efficiency and the defining of prac-
tices as obsolescent. And these differences constitute values. 
We need to explain what we mean by values, but we can only do so 
with a clearer idea of what we mean by efficiency and obsoles-
cence. 
The technological involves efficiency. It involves effi-
ciency in the sense of a causa efficiens or efficient cause. The 
technological is a producing, a bringing forth from what is, for 
yet another way to think about technology is it is that which 
facilitates. But in addition to this, technology is also con-
cerned with a revealing of truth. Rojcewicz (2006) notes that 
this is precisely how we should take production in Heidegger’s 
sense: It is a drawing forth which is also a disconcealment or 
revealing of truth. Technology is that which lends itself to 
bringing about making and doing while at the same time reveal-
ing. Thus, the progress of technology is a ceaseless drive to 
make more progress. However, technology itself does not answer 
the question of why things should progress in the first place. 
This is so because technological progression is an aim without a 
target. More recent scholarship on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Eth-
ics have followed the distinction that between telos and skopos. 
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Whereas telos refers to an aim, skopos refers to a target. The 
two concepts are easily confused, especially when we think of 
teleology as being end related. Pakaluk (2005) tries to differ-
entiate the two by translating the former as “goal-like” and the 
latter as “target” (pp. 317, 321). Its aim is without a target 
because its aim is only towards an aim which is itself. Technol-
ogy is an aim aimed at aim. How so? It’s the progression of pro-
gress. But what can we mean by this if we are claiming that 
technological progression is not a movement? Isn’t progression a 
movement? Progression is not a movement if we maintain a dis-
tinction between progressing and a progression. Progressing is 
something that occurs through time. It’s diachronic. A progres-
sion is synchronic. It’s something ascertained at a point in 
time, deduced from the existence of two events that have already 
occurred and exist as contemporaneous inasmuch as both are re-
membered. What does this mean? 
Techniques exist simultaneously. The techniques are memori-
alized by the products of those techniques, and in order to be a 
technique as such, a certain type of remembering is necessary. 
There’s no technique without the possibility of repetition. As 
Heidegger (1982) notes, a craft isn’t a craft if it isn’t prac-
ticed. Further still, the remembrance of a particular technique 
isn’t a remembrance of only itself. It’s also a remembrance of 
other techniques. Any technique brings with it a history of 
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other techniques that have made that technique possible. Those 
other techniques may be incorporated into that technique and in 
this way remembered, or a technique itself may have arisen as a 
replacement to another technique. If the case is the latter, 
then the replaced technique is remembered by the replacing tech-
nique in the form of obsolescence. Obsolescence is not when a 
technique is falsified. Techniques are practices and are neither 
true nor false. Rather, techniques become replaced when another 
technique helps us achieve something we value in a way that is 
more efficient. But if this is so, techniques and, hence, tech-
nology would be instrumental goods, and this is precisely what I 
said I was not claiming. In other words, one might object that 
if we value, then we are valuing something. The fact that tech-
niques are replaced is evidence of the evaluative, and because 
techniques produce a result, we must view technology as instru-
mental. This is a strong objection, but could it be that though 
techniques cannot exist without the produced, the value belong-
ing to the technological can exist without an object? I’ll sug-
gest that value can be directed upon itself and in this way 
value becomes universal instead of being something historically 
and culturally contingent. But to explain this, I need to ex-
plain the notion of aim. 
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II. AIM 
An aim is a trajectory. A trajectory is a path through which 
something can move. But to have a path is not necessarily to 
have a movement through that path. To have movement, there must 
be two things: 1. a path through which the movement can occur 
and 2. something to move through that path. To have a path, 
then, is a necessary condition for movement, but it isn’t suffi-
cient. There needs to be something that can move. If in techno-
logical progression, we say that the technology is what can move 
forward, then we’re reifying technology. Above, I rejected an 
instrumental view of technology, and here I am rejecting a sub-
stantive view of technology. We’re saying that it’s technology 
itself that moves through the path, but this is to confuse tech-
nology for a material thing. It’s in this way that it helps to 
think of technology as an aim only. Technology is a path insofar 
as it’s the potential for movement, not movement itself. Fur-
ther, it’s only a potential for movement because nothing actu-
ally moves through technology. To make a metaphor, one can build 
a road through which no one travels. Again, I consider technol-
ogy to be a progression. I’m taking technology to be that which 
is deduced synchronically from events having occurred. It’s a 
snapshot, so to speak, of how a constellation of techniques are 
arranged with relation to each other. I view technology as the 
state of the art. 
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To be clear, what I reject from an instrumental view of 
technology is the finality of ends that it assumes. Technology 
is not a mere means by which we attain something we value be-
cause the end of technology is progression, something itself an 
aim. Further, if I am claiming that technological progression is 
an aim, then perforce I cannot hold a substantive view. An aim 
is not something material. So to take stock of what I am claim-
ing thus far, technological progression is not an indivisible 
movement insofar as its progression is not determined by a trav-
ersing, by the getting from one point to another. It isn’t a de-
velopment. Rather, technological progression occurs when there’s 
a determinateness between simultaneously existing techniques (or 
groupings of techniques) that have the same end. That which 
makes those techniques determinate is a difference in effi-
ciency. This difference in efficiency gives rise to certain 
techniques being valued as obsolescent and others as state of 
the art. But we had put aside the question of valuing. How is 
valuing important to our discussion? 
 
III. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESSION AND THE POLITICAL AS ACTS OF VALUING 
Technological progression, although not a movement is an 
aim. It’s a particular type of aim that has no target. Tech-
niques themselves have targets; techniques are instrumental and 
as aims can attain their targets. However, once a technique be-
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comes part of the technological and gets caught up in techno-
logical progression, there’s a residue. That residue is the de-
mand for efficiency of technological progression. This is noth-
ing but an act of evaluation, or valuing.  
Values and ends are different. For instance, if I have a 
typewriter, I know its end is to produce typewritten documents. 
But still, I haven’t made a judgment upon the value of a type-
writer. It may be, for instance that I believe the typewriter to 
be of negative value if I value only handwritten documents and 
feel that typed documents are deplorable. Conversely, if I value 
legibility, then a typewriter is a valuable object. And because 
the word processing computer is even more efficient than the 
typewriter at producing these typed documents, I would hold the 
computer to be more valuable. But this is an example of some-
thing, an example of technological progression. And as we know 
examples work only because they are a universalizable singular 
(Agamben, 1993). If we think outwardly, it must be that techno-
logical progression has value also. But what is the value of 
technological progression? The value of technological progres-
sion has to do with life, with a life that is particular to be-
ing human. And what distinguishes human life from other forms of 
life is that the human is a political animal. In this way, the 
technological is an aim directed in the same way as the politi-
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cal. But what does it mean to say that the technological and the 
political are similar as aims?  
It isn’t to assert the idea of a political technology, the 
way that the political deploys techniques to control bodies. It 
isn’t that which you find in the first volume of Foucault’s 
(1990) History of Sexuality. No, what I mean is that the politi-
cal and the technological have the same aim insofar as both at-
tempt to preserve and make better human life. For instance, 
techniques such as those in biomedical technology help keep us 
alive. Similarly, very broadly speaking, there are laws that are 
made to protect our lives from harm. But this is life in the 
sense of bare life. If we are thinking of the life that is par-
ticularly human, then we are thinking of a form of life to which 
technology and the political must have a different relationship. 
We are thinking about a form of life that consists of demands 
that can be articulated by a speaking subject. But what are 
those demands? This is to be political, properly speaking. 
 To be political is to make demands for justice, and like 
the technological, political progression is not best thought of 
as a movement. To think of it as a movement makes the project of 
the political to treat the political subject as that which is 
only given over to death. It is to treat the subject as only 
something that can die, and this form of life is not particu-
larly human insofar as death is quality that human life shares 
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with other forms of life. Technology can make life better or 
worse. There’s an ethic for technology precisely because of 
this. Namely, as Jonas (1984) shows, we have the duty to be re-
sponsible with regard to technology for the reason that technol-
ogy has surpassed being a somewhat effective means to achieve 
moderate ends. Now, modern technology is an infinite thrust and 
has become central to human purpose. But again, if we have this 
drive, the question is to what are we driven? I think what Jonas 
suggests, though not explicitly, is that since technology is an 
infinite thrust, it can only be this drive. Something that is 
infinite is something without a target. Had it a target, then it 
would be something finite, something that would end once the 
target is reached. Thus, if technology is central to the end of 
what it means to be human, then the end of what it means to be 
human is something that isn’t an end at all. And it is in this 
way that I believe we should look at human flourishing. We will 
take the view that human flourishing has less to do with some-
thing individual, but more to do with the concept of the neigh-
bor. Further, to be properly human, both the technological and 
the political have to take a path that is similar to the psycho-
analytical concept of desire. But before we do this, we must say 
more about what counts as the activity of valuing for the po-
litical. We have hinted that the concepts of efficiency and ob-
solescence are activities of valuing for technology, but what is 
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this when taken as an analogue for the political. I’m suggesting 
that the seeking of justice is the activity of valuing in the 
political.  
 
IV. WHAT IS JUSTICE? 
I should first explain what I mean by injustice because 
this has to do with the conception of Lacan’s symbolic. Injus-
tice, for our purposes, is a part of justice, part of it because 
it is partial justice. It isn’t, in other words, that which is 
not justice. That which is negatively determined from justice is 
what one has in the state of nature. Justice is that which re-
lates to the law, and in a state of nature, the law is not. If 
there is—perhaps only as a hypothetical place holder—a pure 
imaginary, then in this pure imaginary, there are no laws, for 
laws are only symbolic. For our purposes, the imaginary is 
equivalent to the state of nature. In the state of nature, if 
there is any type of social—as opposed to political—
organization, it would be identificatory. We’re always presup-
posing the symbolic when there’s a subject. And when we aren’t 
merely creatures in the animalistic, imaginary state of nature, 
but subjects of the State, something that’s an entity insofar as 
it is only through its laws, the law always pertains to us. But 
to continue, justice is the target of a particular type of de-
mand. It’s the target of a political demand. Demands themselves 
  
75 
are articulations of drives, and going further back, drives cir-
cle around their object because the purpose of a drive is to re-
produce itself. In other words, a drive does not seek satisfac-
tion in its object, because it only seeks to continue being a 
drive. This is the compulsive nature of the drive. Zizek (1991) 
calls this compulsion a mechanical insistence, one that cannot 
be caught up in the dialectic of desire. It is something that is 
demanded, and one persists in it to the end. It’s compelled to 
repeat itself. And though he is talking about Nietzsche, I think 
Heidegger (1987) has a useful insight regarding desire that’s 
compatible with what we’re saying. Namely he notes that for 
Nietzsche, willing is a kind of desiring and striving that is 
not a blind compulsion because, "What is desired and striven for 
is represented as such along with the compulsion" (p. 54). In 
other words, it is not the striving of animals toward food for 
nourishment. The animal does not represent the food to itself as 
such. Thus, if drives don’t get caught up in desire by being ar-
ticulated in a request, we’re left with the pathological. When 
they do become caught up in desire, they aren’t pathological be-
cause they must have first become articulated in a request which 
is dialectical. The request has two parts. First, it’s articu-
lated seeking to satisfy a need, but though that need may become 
satisfied, there’s a remainder that cannot be. That remainder is 
a request for love. So then, requests request two things, and 
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the difference between those two things is what is desire. De-
sire is that part of the request for love that exceeds the de-
mand for a particular need to be satisfied. But this, we should 
remember, is the formulation for unconscious, amorous desire. 
What we’re after is justice, and the demands made regarding jus-
tice need to be transparent to consciousness. At this point, let 
us flesh out part of my argument and anticipate another part. 
 
V. VALUING AS DIRECTED UPON ITSELF AND THE CREATION OF UNIVERSAL VALUES 
Earlier, I had suggested that values can become universal 
if valuing becomes an activity directed toward itself. I think 
this can happen if valuing takes a path similar to how drives 
become desire as described above. Thus, it must be that demands 
for justice must turn upon themselves and become an activity of 
valuing. It must do this to escape being an activity that is 
only concerned with treating human life as only that which is 
given over to death. For if the political, the seeking of jus-
tice, is to be a particularly human activity, it must distin-
guish itself from other forms of life. And although demands for 
justice are equivalent to demands for a particular type of be-
nevolence involving need, what characterizes these demands per-
taining to needs as distinct from the animalistic is that humans 
have a different relationship to ignorance. But before we get 
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too ahead of ourselves, let us explain how demands for justice 
are demands for benevolence. 
Demands for justice are demands for benevolence, a particu-
lar type of benevolence pertaining to needs. When we’re con-
cerned about justice, we attempt to determine the needs in terms 
of political rights and access to material goods that each indi-
vidual has. Once we have done this, we go about trying to meet 
those needs. Thus, demands that have justice as their target do 
not get caught up in something like desire insofar as there’s no 
remainder left after subtracting need from the demand for love. 
In other words, need is not the smaller term when political de-
mands are concerned. There is no demand for love in a political 
demand. However, in the demand for benevolence of justice, the 
need always exceeds any benevolence that can be given. All jus-
tice can do is guarantee that there shall be a protocol for 
meeting those needs should the needs come about. So what we see 
here is the inverse of our formula for desire. Namely, those 
formulas might be thought of as 1. Demand – Need = Demand for 
love (Desire) and 2. Need – Demand = Demand for benevolence 
(Justice). Lacan (1977) writes that “desire is neither the appe-
tite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the differ-
ence that results from the subtraction of the first from the 
second” (287). I have formulated it above slightly differently, 
but I think it amounts to the same thing. This can be so because 
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use of subtraction isn’t quite mathematical. In Lacan’s formula-
tion, desire is that which is the demand for love with need (ap-
petite) subtracted from it. In other words, one is still start-
ing with a demand, but what remains after the “subtraction” is a 
pure demand for love. For that reason, I think it’s simpler to 
think of the demand for love as equivalent to desire as long as 
we factor out need. With justice, what is in excess is never the 
demand, as in desire, but the need. For example, though I may 
have an apparatus that guarantees that I am never without food 
or shelter, you cannot shelter and feed me just once. I may only 
have to articulate my political demand a finite number of times, 
but the need persists and will persist, too, in others like me. 
What we have shown thus far, then, is that when there’s part of 
a demand that exceeds need, there’s desire; and when need ex-
ceeds the demand, we have an issue of justice. 
But what we should not forget here is that this type of 
justice focuses upon a subject that is different from the way 
Lacan might mean it. Namely, this is the subject of the State, 
an entity in which the symbolic consists of a constitution, a 
network of laws: in sum, justice. This isn’t the subject of un-
conscious desire. So we see that we have at least two types of 
subjects. We have the subject of justice and the subject of de-
sire. The differences between these two are in many ways diamet-
rical. The subject of justice has an excess of need, does not 
  
79 
exist in the unconscious, and is caught up in the cycle of life 
and death. The subject of desire has an excess of demand, exists 
in the unconscious, and is immortal. We’ve already shown the 
difference between the demand for benevolence (justice) and the 
demand for love (desire). Further, we’ve implied that the sub-
jects of justice and desire must respectively belong to the con-
scious and unconscious. The demands of the subject of justice 
are transparent on at least the literal level of the utterance, 
whereas the demands of the subject of desire’s demands are not 
transparent. But how is it that the first is caught up in life 
and death and the other is not? The answer has to do with the 
status of the neighbor and jouissance and its quality of being 
both enjoyment and suffering.  
 
VI. THE NEIGHBOR AND JOUISSANCE 
In his contribution to The Neighbor, Reinhard points out 
along with Žižek that there is a fundamental incommensurability 
between love and justice. Love privileges a singular neighbor, 
while justice is the remembrance of those who are left out when 
privileging the singular other. In other words, justice applies 
uniformly to a symbolic representation of another, and love ap-
plies to another with whom one can have a face-to-face encoun-
ter, a dualistic, imaginary other. But then this is to assert a 
particular conception of justice. If we have a symbolic concep-
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tion of justice, then it cannot be only that which treats the 
human as given over to death. The subject is immortal insofar as 
the subject exists as a signifier, and to signify a thing is in 
some sense to immortalize it. It is to immortalize it insofar as 
to signify is to substitute a signifier for a thing. When this 
substitution occurs, the thing can die, but the substituted sig-
nifier cannot. The signifier is immortal insofar as it is unable 
to die. This is obviously true, for the signifier has not in the 
first place lived. This is the status of the neighbor in the po-
litical. It is a signifier. Thus, if justice is sought for the 
neighbor, and not an individual who can die, the political is 
removed from the realm of the purely animal. But still, we ha-
ven’t explained the concept of jouissance. 
For Lacan, jouissance is both enjoyment and suffering. But 
how can it be these two things? It is both enjoyment and suffer-
ing because it causes suffering for one’s neighbor. But who is 
this neighbor other than the other that is oneself. The neighbor 
is the imaginary neighbor, the other with which the ego is con-
fused. Thus, this neighbor is caught up in the problem of util-
ity. One attempts to maximize the good for the neighbor, but 
this isn’t purely altruistic. One is also maximizing the good 
for oneself. In Lacan’s (1992) words in Seminar VII, “What I 
want is the good of others provided that it remain in the image 
of my own” (p. 187). So here is a paradox, one that Lacan 
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doesn’t mention explicitly, but one that’s nonetheless implied. 
Let’s suppose that altruism is our ethical imperative, that we 
must always be altruistic no matter what. If I attempt to show 
altruism toward my neighbor, then isn’t it the case that my 
neighbor must refuse that altruism, for altruism is equally a 
requirement for him or her? We might say that this is what Lacan 
means when he says, with respect to this sort of utilitarian al-
truism, “I am damned for having assured him to whom it would 
cost more time and trouble than me, what precisely? — some meas-
ure of ease that only means something because I imagine that, if 
I had that ease or absence of work, I would make the best possi-
ble use of it” (187). But this somewhat lighthearted observation 
isn’t the most significant implication of this paradox. What if 
this neighbor has a need that exceeds a demand, a demand that he 
or she doesn’t necessarily utter, but one that’s made upon us by 
the altruism encoded in justice? In mendicancy, for example, we 
better see how jouissance is suffering. A beggar is in no posi-
tion to refuse altruism because this person’s existence is 
caught up with death. Thus, since this is the domain of justice, 
justice is caught up in the domain of life and death. It’s con-
cerned with an animal existence, not with that which is immortal 
in the human. What we see is that the subject of desire tends 
toward jouissance. It’s unconcerned with issues of life or 
death. We can understand Lacan in this way when he says that 
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jouissance is the acceptance of death without sublimation (189). 
Further, we see again that pursuing desires cannot be out of 
compulsion like that which is animalistic. 
But here we again see justice as caught up with the domain 
of life and death, as that which treats its subject as that 
which is given over to death. Why is it that justice seems to 
move back and forth between the animal and the particularly hu-
man. I suggest that it is a transitional space. Transitional 
spaces—perhaps in the same way that Schmitt (2005) suggests that 
borderline concepts are not vague concepts but ones pertaining 
to the outermost itself—might be interpreted in other ways than 
that which is a little bit of this, a little bit of that, or 
could be this or that. A border or transitional space can be 
thought about as the most extreme position of this space and 
that space, as the extremity of all the spaces adjacent to each 
other. It will become more clear why the political, and the 
technological are such spaces, but we should say more about hu-
man life first. Namely, it partakes in the infinite by way of 
the technological and the political, but it is a particular con-
ception of the infinite. 
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VII. HUMAN LIFE AS PARTAKING IN THE INFINITE AS MEDIATED BY THE IDEA OF IGNO-
RANCE 
In Seminar XVII, Lacan (2007) follows Bichat and asserts 
that life as the totality of forces that resist death. This is 
the life that belongs to the political subject demanding jus-
tice. This is the subject that can suffer. But there is the 
other subject of desire that suffers, but in the way of a suf-
fering enjoyment. And this desiring subject is the one answer-
able to Lacan’s ethical imperative to never give ground to your 
desire. But what does it mean to not give ground to your desire? 
In Ethics, writing that since desire is in the domain of the un-
conscious, Badiou (2001) interprets this imperative as not giv-
ing up on that part of yourself that you do not know. Butler 
(2005) adds that nowhere in this imperative does it suggest that 
desire must be satisfied, only that it mustn’t be stopped. How-
ever, I think the essence of the imperative is best explained by 
Egginton (2006). Egginton writes that this imperative considers 
desire as desire. It is acting upon one’s desires knowing full 
well that they will not be satisfied, “that despite and in the 
face of the most extraordinary experience of rapture, desire, as 
it always does, will go on” (165). We’ll again pick up with how 
the technological and the political overlap as aims with a dis-
cussion about Rawls, but we need to explain how the drive of 
technology is infinite, and in what way this relates to the 
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workings of desire as that which continues despite its lack of 
object. This will lead into a discussion of ignorance, that 
which I am claiming is what distinguishes the way human needs 
are structured as opposed to the animal. So the drive of tech-
nology is infinite, but infinite in what way? 
It isn’t the sort of drive that seeks to perpetuate itself. 
This sort of drive is infinite insofar as it’s a totality con-
sisting of parts that support each other rather than limiting 
each other. Rather, technology is infinite in the way that it is 
not finite. It’s infinite because it goes over and against the 
finite. It both exceeds the finite and is the opposition of the 
finite. It’s the infinite of having always one more possible. 
It’s what Hegel might call a bad or spurious infinity. Here the 
infinite is the negation of the finite, and because it is not 
contained in the finite, it finds its limits there. But for the 
infinite to have any limit would make it not infinite, for to be 
infinite is to be without limits (Science of Logic, 153). Tech-
nology, being this sort of infinite drive, or thrust, has the 
perpetual possibility of being more efficient, of producing 
more. In this way it can never reach its target, for the target 
is always just beyond the state of the art. We might think of a 
certain genre of marketing slogans, the ones that are various 
iterations of having tomorrow’s technology today. While the con-
sumer gets the sense that what’s being promised to them is the 
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state of the art, he or she also knows that this isn’t actually 
possible, for tomorrow never is; it’s only always a speculation. 
But why is this important? 
 If we look at technology as a heaping up of techniques, as 
a standing reserve of knowledge, then we can always add more to 
this. It would be a type of infinite that exceeds the finite and 
is the opposition to it with regard to knowledge. You can always 
know more. This knowing more is always possible. But what’s 
wrong with this type of accumulation is that it, too, has a 
limit. That limit is ignorance. Thus, the infinite progress of 
knowledge is perpetually defined by what is just beyond that 
highest state of knowing: that which is not known. Thus, what 
stands at both sides of the state of the art is ignorance. The 
state of the art is the place in which ignorance is behind and 
in front of it. For when we move forth in knowledge, we leave 
ignorance of what we now know behind, but there is still igno-
rance in front of what we know, for how is one to know what one 
doesn’t know? How is one sure that there isn’t something left to 
know? The answer is that one can’t. With this conception of 
technology as an infinite drive, we can by definition never get 
to a goal, because it is an aim such that our goals are some-
thing that we never know. This is the technology explained by a 
metaphor of movement. But if we don’t use a metaphor of move-
ment, then we needen’t fall into this trap. 
  
86 
 If we turn technology into a drive that’s self-contained, 
then there isn’t the problem of forward from what and toward 
what. But in order to do this, we must have a conception of ig-
norance which doesn’t limit technology. It isn’t that because we 
have finite knowledge we are ignorant and that the potential for 
knowledge is always there, so it is infinite. Rather, we need to 
conceive of ignorance and knowledge as a unity. Ignorance and 
knowledge must be bound together in a relationship of mutual 
support. Ignorance isn’t the thing that needs to be perpetually 
turned into knowledge. This system is an absolute system, so it 
must be that ignorance and knowledge are equally important and 
contained within each other. How is this so? How can ignorance 
be important and not just something of which we need to rid our-
selves? 
 One type of ignorance is an acknowledgement of a lack of 
knowledge. When I claim to be ignorant of something, I am claim-
ing that I know that there is something to be known, but that I 
cannot know it. We can list many types of examples of this igno-
rance, but let’s only focus upon one example that will become 
relevant to our discussion. That example is ignorance of the 
contingent or accidental. This type of ignorance is also a type 
of knowledge. It is both because I know a set of possibilities, 
and I know further that the realization of one of the possibili-
ties precludes the other possibilities from occurring. However, 
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until one of the possibilities is realized, I won’t know an out-
come. I am thus ignorant of outcome until then. For instance, I 
know that the first coin that I flip today can come up either 
heads or tails, or it may be that I won’t flip a coin at all to-
day. Until I flip a coin or the day passes without having 
flipped one, I am ignorant of the outcome. But let’s take an ex-
ample in which the stakes are somewhat higher, an example that 
involves responsibility. 
 What if the example involves a potential threat to continu-
ity of the human race? Let’s say, for instance, that the state 
of the art in genetic engineering is to have techniques to ge-
netically modified certain foods such that the supply of those 
foods becomes more efficiently replenished. Say that I modify 
corn so that it grows much faster than unmodified corn. Let’s 
also suppose that employing such modifications on a certain num-
ber of foods will solve the global hunger problem. And further 
suppose that I’m not entirely certain that this series of ge-
netic modifications won’t disrupt the food chain in such a way 
that causes a global catastrophe or some type of illness in the 
potentially massive numbers of people who will need to consume 
this food if the global hunger problem is to be solved. In this 
scenario, I’m faced with a dilemma: I can potentially solve the 
world hunger problem, but only by putting the entire human popu-
lation at risk. Whether  or not I start to employ this new tech-
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nology depends upon how seriously I take the idea of responsi-
bility. I can either put everyone at risk and hope that nothing 
goes wrong, or I can use some restraint and realize that the 
risk is too great. Either way, ignorance is put into play. 
Firstly, I must acknowledge that although have knowledge of the 
likely possibilities, I am ignorant of what the actual outcome 
might be until it happens. If I am responsible and I take into 
account that one of these possibilities poses too great a risk 
and restrain using the technology, then ignorance is also at 
play. I never took the risk, so I’ll never know what could have 
happened. In other words, it could be heads—global salvation, 
tails—global catastrophe, or I could choose not to flip the coin 
at all. 
 Had we gotten caught up in the notion of technological pro-
gression that is defined by movement, we might run the risk of 
forgetting about responsibility. While it’s doubtful that the 
hard lines of the previous example would actually be drawn as 
distinctly in actuality—either global salvation or global catas-
trophe—the example does have similarity to a truth. We do in 
fact eat genetically modified foods. It’s true that these foods 
have been tested and determined safe, but these foods have been 
placed in the market for consumption without knowing for certain 
the long range implications of doing so. Though the potential 
risks may have been determined to be minimal, no one knows for 
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certain that there won’t be any long range implications, because 
a significant amount of time hasn’t passed before these products 
were mass produced and mass consumed. With genetically modified 
foods, we have not chosen to not flip the coin. And without 
sounding too alarmist, we can at least take the point that igno-
rance and knowledge are intertwined in this example, that it 
can’t simply be the point to replace ignorance with knowledge. 
Were this the case one might then become inclined to choose to 
solve global hunger with an unknown outcome. In other words, the 
reasoning might be that we should replace the ignorance of not 
knowing whether or not genetically modified foods will cause a 
global catastrophe, possibly at the cost of global catastrophe 
being realized. Again, the lines might not be this distinct, but 
the fact is that we do eat genetically modified foods. And with 
this example, we can see how the needs of the human differ from 
the needs of the purely animal. As I had suggested along with 
Heidegger above, the animal does not represent food to itself as 
such. The need for food is shared with by the human and the ani-
mal. However, the human must also consider responsibility along 
with need, and as we have seen, this involves a kind of igno-
rance. How so? Technological progression is a progress of knowl-
edge through the use of communication, but as such, it should 
not be an imperative to replace all ignorance with knowledge. 
Ignorance and knowledge are part of a system in which one is not 
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the limit of the other. In the system of ignorance and knowl-
edge, both are necessary insofar as they support each other. Let 
us call this a mindful ignorance. 
 Let us call this ignorance mindful insofar as it isn’t an 
ignorance of not knowing. For instance, the animal, too, can be 
ignorant about global catastrophe, but this is an ignorance that 
results from the structural impossibility of knowing that is 
characteristic of the animal. Because the animal cannot repre-
sent anything to itself other than something that is in itself, 
knowledge is not possible. Since knowledge is not possible in 
the first place, only ignorance of all is possible. I, too, can 
have this type of ignorance. For instance, I may not know the 
author of A Theory of Justice because I have no idea that this 
book exists. It would be structurally impossible for me know 
this book’s author if I don’t first know about the book. But it 
may be that I may not know the author of the book because I ha-
ven’t yet learned it. In this way, ignorance is mindful insofar 
as I am aware that this book has an author, only I acknowledge 
that I do not know its author. Thus, mindful ignorance is a 
knowing of something only as that which might become known. It 
is this type of mindful ignorance that is important to justice, 
and creating that which guarantees justice: a just constitution. 
We shall see too, via Rawls, how ignorance is put into play, 
namely through a discussion about the veil of ignorance which is 
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a requirement of the original position, this space in which a 
just constitution must be conceived. 
 
VII. JUSTICE AND IGNORANCE 
What is it to be veiled? A veil is a covering, so something 
veiled is something covered. But to be veiled is to be covered 
in a particular way. A veil is a covering calling attention to 
itself as a covering, so as such, something veiled is something 
covered obviously. A veil isn’t a covering hiding what’s covered 
in a way either allowing or intending the forgetting about 
what’s covered. Rather, a veil’s conspicuousness reminds us 
about the covered thing. It reminds us that there’s something to 
which we aren’t allowed access. So what is a veil of ignorance? 
Again, for our purposes, a knowing of something only as that 
which might become known is mindful ignorance. Thus, a veil of 
ignorance is a covering of something whereby the cover consists 
of a knowing of something only as that which might become known. 
It’s a covering by ignorance neither allowing nor intending the 
forgetting about what it covers. What the ignorance covers is 
its own object. But what is the object of the veil of ignorance? 
 In the veil of ignorance, what’s veiled is any sort of in-
formation that would allow a group or individual to tailor prin-
ciples to create advantage. Generally speaking, they are one’s 
temporal position, situation in society, or natural advantages 
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(Rawls, 1999). It’s necessary for principles to exist between 
generations in order that justice be something enduring. One’s 
temporal position, therefore, must be veiled to ensure that 
principles chosen are ones that will hold for all generations. 
It’s also true that society has different positions that come to 
be occupied by individuals. Principles need to be made with this 
in mind, and to veil one’s own social position ensures that one 
cannot tailor principles to advantage that particular social po-
sition. Further, individuals are endowed with abilities differ-
ent from each other, so these too must be veiled. In other 
words, the components of one’s social reality must remain 
veiled. But what does this mean? 
 What gives rise to social reality is ideology, so if the 
components of one’s social reality are veiled, what is veiled is 
that which has been produced as reality by ideology. To say ide-
ology is our only reality isn’t to say that there’s something 
more real to which we have access. It’s precisely to say that 
there isn’t anything that has more reality. It’s to say that as 
far as reality is concerned, ideology is all we have. This has 
implications for how we might read Rawls. 
One way we might read Rawls is to say that what he wishes 
to do with the original position is to create a non-ideological 
political space. Now we know that this idea seems to be a con-
tradiction in terms, but herein lies the brilliance of the veil 
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of ignorance. A veil does not change the object that it covers. 
Rather, it only hides that object in plain sight. It isn’t as 
though Rawls is saying that we should forget about the ideologi-
cal when attempting to construct a just constitution. The fact 
that the products of ideology are veiled remind us that they are 
there. Thus, what the veil of ignorance solves is the problem 
caused by the fact of ideology being our only reality. One might 
argue that if ideology is our only reality, then one can’t con-
struct any constitution that is non-ideological, for if ideology 
pervades all reality, and we construct principles from that re-
ality, the result will be ideological. There is no outside to 
ideology. However, Rawls’s solution seems to be one that neither 
needs to deny that all reality is ideological nor to be bound to 
it. Because the products of ideology remain veiled—remain known 
as that which might be known—there is not a need to deny that 
the components are ideological. However, ideology must function 
in a state of recognition. One thinks of Althusser’s hailing po-
lice officer and the subject who responds. If there is not rec-
ognition, then ideology doesn’t function. So when ignorance 
veils the components and makes them unrecognizable, yet we still 
build with those components, we have built without being held 
under the yoke of ideology. We are building a constitution with-
out being subjects of and to ideology. Once the veil is lifted, 
we may see that what we have produced is in fact ideological, 
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but we have produced it in a space that was not ideological. And 
thus, with the veil of ignorance, we are able to enter this 
space to modify the constitution as needed non-ideologically. 
The metaphor of the veil works nicely here insofar as a veil can 
be lifted and lowered as needed without changing that which it 
covers. But what does this have to do with technology? 
 
IX. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND THE POLITICAL 
If technology is generally synonymous with not only a mak-
ing and doing, but also a revealing or disconcealment that leads 
to truth, then we see something interesting in Rawls. Namely, we 
see that a mindful ignorance reveals truth. Thus, we cannot say 
that the way to truth is to empty out the unknown with the 
known. Ignorance is a necessary component of revealing truth. It 
is sometimes the case that the truth must be veiled, covered in 
a way that is not a forgetting. The way to truth isn’t as simple 
as a mere uncovering, for this is to assume that there is only 
one type of covering—the covering of hiddeness—and further, we 
need to deal with the condition of our reality which is ideo-
logical. And it is here with Rawls that we see that valuing in a 
universal, just way—the way through the original position—
requires that the human have a particular relationship to igno-
rance. 
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I think Žižek (2004) is right to assert that the trick of 
ideology is to make us believe that justice is an impossible 
ideal, when in truth it’s fully realizable. However, I would add 
that justice is realizable in a particularly problematic way. 
The realization of justice is always only possible. It’s always 
only a potential, but never anything that will have been actu-
ated. This is different from saying that the realization is 
never possible. “Never possible” is the same as the not possible 
or the impossible. It’s that which cannot happen. However, that 
which is “always only possible” is that which can happen, but 
won’t. It’s what could be, but never will have been. For in-
stance, when we add the expression, “When pigs fly,” to the ut-
terance of a promise we don’t intend to keep, we know it’s en-
tirely possible that there could occur a genetic mutation in 
pigs that would over many generations give them the ability to 
fly. Still, there’s something that forever keeps this from being 
realized. This is somewhat nominalist, but that which keeps this 
from being realized is the fact that if this does indeed happen, 
the flying creature would no longer belong to the class of pigs, 
but to something else with a different DNA sequence, etc. Thus, 
it’s only a perpetual possibility. In short, I think we might 
think about justice as that which will only perpetually be pos-
sible. But what is it that keeps justice in this state of per-
petual possibility? It’s the fact that justice partakes in a bad 
  
96 
infinity, the infinity of the always one more. This is the same 
perpetual possibility that pervades certain conceptions of tech-
nology, conceptions that view technology as a movement. Rather, 
to think both the political and technology as things which have 
the possibility of attaining truth, we need to consider them in 
ways other than those that need a recourse to this bad infinity. 
We can do so by thinking of both as things that indeed have de-
velopment, but not through time. We need to think of both 
synchronically, and to do so, we need to think of both in terms 
of valuing. It is true that values can be culturally and his-
torically contingent, but there are types of values that are 
not. And these types of values must be created in a space that 
somehow escapes the hold of ideology. As, we’ve seen with the 
closing discussion on Rawls, ignorance is a necessary component 
for this to be possible. 
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Chapter 5: Pursuing Our Projects 
 
I. CHANGING THE WORLD 
It’s easy to imagine Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach handwritten 
on a sticky note taped to the computer monitor of a progressive 
scholar. What might be more difficult, however, is to imagine 
another such sticky note containing Nietzsche’s command to pur-
sue your best or worst desires or Lacan’s ethical imperative to 
never give up on your desire. In light of all the suffering and 
injustice that exists, it seems flippant to be concerned about 
desire, especially just one’s own. On the face of it, it seems 
that there’s an order of concerns that should be followed. 
First, we must contended with the material suffering of the 
other, and only then can we be free to consider things of secon-
dary importance such as desire. Here, what is of utmost impor-
tance would be that we act according to an ethic that pursues 
the expediting of the elimination of the other’s suffering. And 
the most expeditious way to do this is to seek justice. But are 
things this simple? 
 I think things are more complex, but I don’t mean to sug-
gest that the suffering of the other is of less importance than 
the pursuit of one’s own desire. What I will suggest, however, 
is that isolating justice as the sole means by which humans can 
achieve their final end is misled. I agree with Badiou that we 
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only encounter problems when we pursue truth by means of only 
one procedure. Badiou (1999) argues that philosophy becomes sus-
pended when it becomes sutured to one of its truth condition, of 
which there are four between which there must be intellectual 
circulation. One such suturing exists in canonical Marxism 
wherein philosophy is sutured to its political condition only. 
If we look to justice alone for the solution to the problem of 
non-flourishing, then we necessarily reach an impasse. Further, 
I will suggest that the political and the amorous, the respec-
tive domains of justice and desire, are intertwined in such a 
way that to think about justice outside of desire is to treat 
the beneficiary of justice as something less than human. What 
Badiou (2001) suggests, and I agree, is that we should not look 
at the human as that which can define itself as a victim. To do 
this is to see the human condition as being merely biological, 
as animal, a condition in which the worst possible thing that 
could happen is death. This is the conception of the human as a 
being-for-death, as a mortal. Rather, one might understand being 
human as that which tends toward the immortal, that which has a 
different relationship to death. In order to have this concep-
tion of the human, we must go outside of the realm of the po-
litical. We must consider desire and enter the political only 
from this perspective. 
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II. YOUR BEST AND YOUR WORST DESIRES 
In Book I, §1 of The Gay Science, addressing the issue of the 
preservation of the species as being the end of human existence, 
Nietzsche (1974) gives us a strange command: “Pursue your best 
or your worst desires, and above all, perish!” Let’s examine 
this command in two parts. 
What does it mean to pursue your best or worse desires? 
When we evaluate desires in terms of best or worst, the implica-
tions are that we ought to pursue the best desires, ought not to 
pursue the worst. In this evaluation, there’s an implicit sug-
gestion, if not a command. However, if we’re commanded to pursue 
either, the implication is different. Consider what Nietzsche 
writes in the sentence following: “In both cases, you are proba-
bly a promoter and benefactor of humanity.” Is it that Nietzsche 
is suggesting that the end of preserving the species is unimpor-
tant and that we may thus do whatever we please? Were this the 
case, we could reason that if preserving the species is unimpor-
tant, then the other is unimportant, and I need not consider the 
effects of my actions upon that other. Indeed, such a conception 
seems not only to disregard the other, but to be contemptuous. 
I’d like to suggest, though, that this is an unnecessarily ex-
treme interpretation. Rather, it seems that Nietzsche is urging 
us to reconsider our understanding of desire. But how so? First, 
in framing the pursuit of our desires in this way, he removes 
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desire from the realm of utilitarianism. Second, he removes the 
evaluative categories of best or worst from the realm of desire. 
Desire is removed from the realm of utilitarianism insofar as 
the end of preserving the species will be met regardless of 
whether or not the best or worst desires are pursued. There is 
no outcome to consider. And it is this move, precisely, that al-
lows Nietzsche to make the second move of removing the evalua-
tive categories from the realm of desire. The pursuit of a par-
ticular desire can only be deemed in terms of best and worst if 
the pursuit of desire is something like an instrumental good, if 
we pursue desire to achieve some final end. If there’s no out-
come regarding desire to consider in the first place, then the 
evaluative categories don’t make sense. If not for some end, why 
would desires be either best or worst? They can only be best or 
worst for something. 
In fact, in §4, Nietzsche makes the link between utilitari-
anism and the application of the evaluative categories a bit 
more clear, if in a somewhat oblique way. He writes that there 
is a “profoundly erroneous moral doctrine that is celebrated es-
pecially in England: this holds that judgments of ‘good’ and 
‘evil’ sum up experiences of what is ‘expedient’ and ‘inexpedi-
ent’.” Here, in this reference to utilitarianism, Nietzsche 
writes that what is understood to be good is that which is spe-
cies-preserving, and that which is not is understood to be evil. 
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However, it often proves to be the case that “evil instincts are 
expedient, species-preserving, and indispensable to as high a 
degree as the good ones.” So in this utilitarianism, not only do 
we get into the problem of the ‘good/evil’ type of morality that 
Nietzsche finds problematic, but see that the terms good and 
evil are applicable at most to instincts, not desires. There’s a 
subtle move here towards a distinction. When Nietzsche writes of 
desires in §1, the evaluative categories do not apply, when he 
legitimizes the use of the evaluative categories of good and 
evil—categories similar to best and worst when used within the 
context of the ends based—we see that we have shifted from de-
sires to instincts. Thus, what we see here is that Nietzsche 
considers desire as desire, not as a means to an end, nor as 
something that is biological or compulsive as the instinct. This 
means that desire is not instrumental and cannot be pathologi-
cal. But this is only the first part of the command. What about 
the second part, ‘and above all, perish!’? 
In addition to pursuing our best or worst desires, we’re 
commanded to do something. And strangely, that something is to 
die. It seems strange because commands are given when the com-
manded has an initial choice prior to being possibly compelled 
to obey. On the forced choice, Zizek (2001) writes that member-
ship in any society involves a subject choosing freely what will 
be imposed on that subject anyway. To embrace freely the state 
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of things entails "integrating this state of things into one's 
symbolic universe," writing further that, "In this precise 
sense, the gesture of willing freely one's own death signals the 
readiness to come to terms with one's death on the symbolic 
level as well, to abandon the mirage of symbolic immortality" 
(p. 112). Although Zizek is here discussing Wagner, we can draw 
a parallel to the example of Nietzsche we are examining. One 
might object here that there’s no initial choice in the first 
place, and rightly so. Humans are mortal and must die, regard-
less of being commanded or not. In fact, this objection echoes a 
caution Nietzsche (1966) himself makes against Stoic philoso-
phy’s imperative to live according to nature: “Why make a prin-
ciple out of something you already are and needs must be?” (§9). 
The answer is that this is an attempt on the part of the Stoics 
to incorporate into nature their own ideals by issuing something 
that only seems to have the grammar of a command. It’s for this 
reason that the Stoics, insofar as they are unaware that this is 
what they’re doing, are “self-deceivers.” Thus, it doesn’t seem 
likely that Nietzsche would have intended the command to perish 
to be a command formulated quite in this self-deceptive way. So 
if this is not a self-deceptive command, something else must be 
going on. 
It must be that Nietzsche thinks of perishing other than in 
the way one is usually accustomed to thinking about it. Namely, 
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Nietzsche (1978) seems to think that perishing has a relation-
ship to willing. And further, this is how we might interpret dy-
ing at the right time, the voluntary death that comes because 
one wishes it (“On Voluntary Death”). The relationship, however, 
isn’t one of a choosing between options. It isn’t that Nietzsche 
thinks we can choose when or when not to have our non-volitional 
death. People fall ill and accidents happen. Nor is he saying 
that death should instead always be volitional; voluntary death 
isn’t suicide. Even when Nietzsche explicitly writes about sui-
cide, this still isn’t the point. For instance, Nietzsche (1996) 
asks why it should be laudable that an old man “who senses the 
decline of his power to await his slow exhaustion and dissolu-
tion than in full consciousness to set himself a limit?” (§80, 
Part I). Further, he follows this passage writing, “There exists 
a right by which we take a man’s life, but none by which we take 
from him his death: this is mere cruelty” (§88, Part I). What’s 
at stake in these two passages? 
In the first passage, the point is that suicide is better 
than dying without being able to will. It’s better to will a 
limit. Suicide is a wholly natural and obvious action, but it is 
only insofar as it’s a victory of reason. Suicide isn’t laudable 
in and of itself. Further, there’s some resonance with the 
criticism of the preachers of a slow death (“On Voluntary 
Death”) who preach “patience with all ‘earthly things’” 
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(Nietzsche, 1978). Aren’t these earthly things all that is 
caught up with the biological, or put another way, that which is 
not immortal in the human? Thus, a patience for these things is 
a succumbing to the biological as with the example of praising 
the old man who accepts the decline of his power. In the second 
passage, the raising of the issue of being able to take a man’s 
life, but not his death seems tantamount to saying that there is 
something else other than dying at stake here. We might have the 
right to execute someone, and this someone can do nothing to 
prevent the execution once we’ve decided to exercise this right. 
Still, even in taking this person’s life, there must remain 
something that belongs to this person even in doing so. And if 
it’s clear that the volitional part of death is neither self-
deception nor mere suicide, what part of this person’s death is 
volitional? Given all this, how can death be related to willing 
without inconsistency? 
 
III. “PERISH, YOU!” - DEATH = WILL TO POWER 
The fact is is that there is indeed some inconsistency, but only 
if we implicitly fault Nietzsche for being ungrammatical, if we 
fault him for not understanding the syntax of a command. If 
Nietzsche is indeed commanding, then by this fact, there must be 
that initial choice, and that initial choice must be something 
else other than death. If we think about death as biological, 
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then what Nietzsche must grant—if, that is, we allow him to re-
main grammatical—is this: All death (other than the possibility 
of suicide which we have eliminated from our interpretation) is 
non-volitional. If, on the other hand, we take death to be some-
thing that is not caught up in the biological, but instead 
caught up in willing, all death is volitional insofar as to 
choose the immortal, the non-biological, is to choose death. 
What is im-mortality but the inability to die? And since death 
does not admit of degrees, how can one die if already dead? 
Thus, the voluntary death of which Nietzsche speaks can actually 
only be understood when taken in light of his command to perish. 
Why? Because when we take this command to be grammatical, it 
must be that the death contained in “Perish!” is but a non-
volitional condition pertaining to a volition that does indeed 
exist as a precondition for some implicit command also contained 
in “Perish!” And what is this command? 
When we eliminate death from the structure of the command 
to perish, all that remains grammatically from that command is 
pure volition itself. To put it quasi-mathematically, “Perish, 
you!” - Death = Pure Volition. To have framed a command in terms 
of death removes the choice between simply willing and not will-
ing. It creates an event in which we must choose to will or not 
to will in the face death, in the face of that which cannot be 
chosen. It is a choosing situated over the void of death, a void 
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that separates the biological and the immortal. At bottom, what 
we see is that willing becomes reflexive. To choose between 
willing or not willing is equivalent to willing to will or doing 
otherwise. But what is this doing otherwise? Is it not willing 
to will, or willing not to will? 
The otherwise that Nietzsche (1989) might attribute to the 
ascetics would be the second, the willing to not will. The as-
cetics would rather will nothingness, than not will at all (§1, 
third essay). Here the will to nothingness is a goal, and an 
achievement of that goal is a triumph over willing. This doesn’t 
constitute what is the not obeying of the command to will to 
will. First, it’s unlikely for Nietzsche to have chosen the as-
cetics as a model to follow when the issue is willing. But more 
importantly, the first formulation—not willing to will—
constitutes the not obeying of the command because willing to 
not will is still willing. Were this the only option, there 
would be no real choice involved, and thus, there would be no 
command. But before this becomes too confusing, let’s allow our-
selves to simplify the formula. As we have shown, the command to 
perish as a command as such must be grammatically transformed 
into the command to will to will in the face of something which 
is both non-volitional and the precondition for volition itself. 
Further, if willing to will is what is called will to power, 
then the command is directed toward the will to power. Heidegger 
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(1987) offers the following interpretation of “will to power”: 
“For in [Nietzsche’s] view will is nothing else than will to 
power, and power nothing else than the essence of will. Hence, 
will to power is will to will” (p. 37). So more generally, ‘Per-
ish!’ as a command can be simplified into the imperative, ‘Have 
will to power!’ 
 
IV. DESIRE! 
To reassess, we’ve removed desire from the realm of any 
evaluative categories and that which is concerned only with 
utility. Further, we can interpret the command to perish as a 
command to have will to power. Thus, together, we see that we 
must pursue our desires as desires that above all wills to will 
in the face of the non-volitional. If we take this formulation 
as a model for Nietzsche’s project, we can see how similar this 
is to Lacan’s ethical imperative to never give up on your de-
sire. But what we have shown thus far makes desire seem modifi-
able, that I can choose my own desire. 
So is the point, then, that desire is modifiable? This 
wouldn’t be very Lacanian. Lacan’s point against ego psychology 
is that it makes the path to wellbeing the modification of de-
sire, and the model to imitate is the desire of the analyst—
‘Just desire as I do, and you, too, will be healthy!’ The point 
of psychoanalysis shouldn’t be the miming of another’s desire, 
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but to not give ground up on one’s own desire. But are desires 
modifiable, then, for Nietzsche? Is it to say that the strong, 
for instance, can will themselves to be weak, and the weak can 
will themselves to be strong? No, for Nietzsche (1989), desires 
are not modifiable either. He writes, for instance, “To demand 
of strength that it should not express itself as strength… is 
just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should express 
itself as strength” (§13, I). So does this mean that Nietzsche 
falls into an essentialism that isn’t compatible with the will 
to power? Not quite. First, this isn’t essentialism because it 
doesn’t have to do with essences, but desire. But more impor-
tantly, it isn’t essentialism because there is no subject here 
that exists non-fictionally. Nietzsche is speaking of strength 
and not the strong. What follows immediately after that passage 
is one that asserts that a quantum of force is equal to a quan-
tum of driving, willing, and effecting, and further, it’s only 
language that makes it appear otherwise, that these things can 
appear caused by a subject. In other words, this measure of 
force—strong or weak—is only willing itself. It only makes sense 
that strength as a type of willing, for instance, can’t be other 
than itself without being something else. And even then, if we 
have recourse to the fiction of the subject, one can’t ask the 
strong to be other than what that subject is because it can’t 
desire that way. But if desires aren’t modifiable, how are they 
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under the yoke of the will? How are they a part of will to 
power, this will to will? They can be thus because in some sense 
desires, even though unmodifiable and in that sense not your 
own, are in another sense your own nonetheless. But how is this 
so, this being one’s own and not?  
Desires are your own insofar as they are unconscious and 
the unconscious is nothing but a type of memory. It’s the memory 
of that which is always irrecoverably “forgotten” already, the 
memory of the repressed. Further, it’s a type of memory that can 
only contain things with the potential of standing in for some-
thing else but does not. These things are signifiers, for only 
signs realize this potential and mean. In this way, then, de-
sires are your own because they are a memory that belongs to 
you. However, the unconscious is also not yours and is outside 
insofar as it’s of the symbolic order, an order that always pre-
cedes the subject both logically and temporally. They symbolic 
contains the subject, and therefore must come before it. So de-
sires are both yours and not yours. This memory constituted of 
signifiers belongs to you, but the memories are not of your own 
making and have come before you. And what is this “you” of which 
we are speaking? It is none other than the subject, or that 
which arises through language, arising according to both Lacan 
and Nietzsche. So desires are your own, but is this not being 
your own equivalent to saying that those desires belong to other 
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people? It can’t be. This wouldn’t make sense for Lacan because 
the argument against adaptation wouldn’t work. Desires would al-
ways be someone else’s already, so were this the case, why com-
mand against miming desires in the first place? Further, for 
Nietzsche, how would it be that we would pursue our desires? 
Let’s explore further why these desires don’t belong to other 
people, again starting with Lacan. 
The symbolic order that contains the unconscious is not the 
social, that which is comprised of the community of other hu-
mans. It’s merely the treasury of signifiers. True, the symbolic 
is the Other, which as a whole can stand in for the Other sub-
ject, but this Other, even as an Other subject is not the same 
as the subject that has an unconscious. This Other subject is 
but a signifier in the unconscious. It does not have an uncon-
scious in the sense that the subject does. The Other subject, in 
other words, doesn’t have the memory of what is forgotten, but 
is part of the memory which is forgotten. The social, this com-
munity of humans, is something we share with animals. It is thus 
imaginary. And if the social is more than this community and in-
volves communication, then, it involves both the imaginary and 
the symbolic taken together in such a way that meaning is gener-
ated between the two orders. Clearly, the symbolic alone is not 
the social. But why is it important that desires not be those of 
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other people? It has to do with the place of justice that we 
have outlined. 
We mustn’t confuse the political with this structure of de-
sire. When demands are articulated on behalf of others, these 
are subjects not of desire, but of politics. The political it-
self is the way through which subjects—let us make note of the 
plural—are addressed in a way which is imaginary, a way of ad-
dressing subjects that are beings toward death. The political is 
that which tries to evade death, rather than being driven toward 
it. Though the demands of politics and the demands of desire are 
different insofar as political demands are transparent and not 
caught up in the dialectic of asking for one thing while really 
wanting that which cannot be granted as satiation, both demands 
have a certain excess. Consider Žižek’s assertion that what’s 
wrong with the configuration of how we currently make political 
demands today—especially those made by leftist scholars—is that 
we tend to “hystericize” those demands. For example, Zizek 
(2003) criticizes Hardt and Negri’s Empire for doing exactly 
this, writing that the three point, positive political program 
of global citizenship, the right to a social wage, and the right 
to reappropriation approaches “the hysterical subject trying to 
provoke the Master by way of bombarding him with impossible de-
mands” (p. 202). Further, writing in a Nietzschean vein, Brown 
(2001) writes that the seemingly political “moralizing injunc-
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tion to act, the contemporary academic formulation of political 
action as an imperative, might be read as a symptom of political 
paralysis in the face of radical political disorientation and as 
a kind of hysterical mask for the despair that attends such pa-
ralysis” (p. 29). This does have a certain amount of explanatory 
power, but we’re still left to question how psychoanalysis might 
be useful for describing how political demands would be made in 
a just State. What a psychoanalytic perspective brings to the 
table is its ability to address excess. Instead of having an ex-
cess in the demand, as we have in desire, we can see that po-
litical demands always have an excess of need. But how, exactly, 
does the psychoanalytic perspective of excess address an excess 
of need? It’s precisely in its positing of jouissance in the 
real. Jouissance is an excess of enjoyment, an enjoyment that as 
such is also suffering. It is an enjoyment in the real since it 
is prohibited to the speaking subject, and the speaking subject 
is absent from the real. The need in political demand is also in 
the real, and it is cut from the same material, so to speak, as 
jouissance. Namely, the need is a material suffering. Further, 
both jouissance and the need of the political demand are at bot-
tom grounded in the idea of rights. Jouissance is doubly enjoy-
ment in terms of being a kind of pleasure and an enjoyment in 
the order of an “enjoyment of rights”. When the need of political 
demands are satisfied, the result is nothing other than this en-
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joyment of rights. So the connection between demands for love 
and political demands for benevolence is what they share in the 
real. 
True, psychoanalysis addresses demands for love, or desire, 
and these are articulated in between the symbolic and imaginary 
dimensions, with the non-articulated, non-attainable object 
cause being in the part of the symbolic which is the uncon-
scious. That which is the object of the political is not uncon-
scious. But the experience of jouissance as it pertains to de-
sire and the experience of need in the political is always in 
the real, is always contained within that which cannot be sym-
bolized. Suffering, whether it’s the enjoyment suffering of 
jouissance or the suffering from a lack of enjoyment of rights, 
is always inarticulable. There’s always a hard kernel, an ex-
cess, that resists being spoken about. The experience of suffer-
ing is never fully communicable. Further, the real is not di-
visible. Division is only possible with the capacity to negate, 
and this capacity to negate is a function of the linguistic. Be-
cause the real lacks signifiers existing in differential rela-
tions, the real is infinite. The concept of infinity is only 
possible in that which is not cut up by signification. It is 
this infinity which gives rise to the infinite need. Needs al-
ways return and are infinite because they never stop being 
needs. This is in the order of the infinity of “always one 
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more”. The infinity of desire and Nietzsche’s eternal return, 
for example, is in the order of circularity. And what I am sug-
gesting is that we need to articulate political demands in terms 
of the latter type of infinity. In other words, to avoid this 
hystericization of political demands, this always having one 
more demand when this or that demand is satisfied, we need to 
make demands in such a way that our demands always return to the 
same place. And that place is precisely the place of human 
flourishing.  
Is this to say that we need to universalize all subjects, 
disregarding the singularity of each? Not necessarily, for the 
eternal return, is not an eternal return of the same. It is a 
repetition, no doubt, but each repetition is singular. For in 
stance, Deleuze (2001) writes that the eternal return is not a 
return of the same because “the same doesn’t come back; only 
coming back is the same in what becomes” (p. 87). It’s only that 
each singularity is universalizable. It isn’t that we need to 
assume a political universal subject and try to claim that all 
individuals are just particulars of this universal. The trajec-
tory of our universalizing should be centrifugal, not centripe-
tal. But let’s be more concrete: What we shouldn’t do is per-
petually create more “victims” as Žižek suggests we might be do-
ing. Consider what Zizek writes: “What we encounter here is 
again the paradox of victimization: the Other to be protected is 
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good  in so far as it remains a victim” (p. 60). We shouldn’t 
start with demands made on behalf of women, let’s say, then when 
those are satisfied, move to demands made on behalf of women of 
color, then move to demands made on behalf of women of color 
with disabilities, and so on. True, all subjects within these 
smaller and smaller categories will have political demands that 
need to be addressed. I am not suggesting that any needs be ig-
nored. Rather, I’m pointing out that this gets into a perpetual 
cycle of creating victimized identities. Identities are not the 
needs themselves, so the creation of identities doesn’t neces-
sarily mean more justice. Also, the creation of an identity 
that’s victimized doesn’t lend itself to flourishing. It only 
names a state of being unable to flourish. Brown (2005) points 
out that endless iterations of narratives of one’s own suffering 
can become ways in which one lives or refuses to live in the 
present, without actually working from those narratives toward 
emancipation. This trajectory is to start broad with the goal of 
addressing narrower and narrower needs. This is the bad infinity 
of the “always one more” insofar as even though we may refine 
our scope to have included every individual, there is still al-
ways the possibility of another individual coming into existence 
that has particular needs. This makes the political project one 
that is theoretically impossible, one that could lead to the 
type of nihilism Nietzsche was critiquing. There are two ver-
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sions of nihilism: 1. the devaluation of our values, and 2. the 
resignment to the idea that our values are unrealizable. These 
are both goal oriented. The first one says that our goals are 
not worth achieving because the values behind them are ground-
less. "Why should anyone aspire to live a flourishing life? Who 
says flourishing is good anyway?" The second one says that there 
is nothing wrong with our values, but that the goals those val-
ues make for us are impossible. "Of course it's good to live a 
flourishing life, but we can never really do that because the 
world is too inhospitable." Reginster (2009) identifies these 
two types of nihilism and asserts that the first leads to a type 
of disorientation, the second to a type of despair.So what 
should we do? 
We might instead start with each individual and treat each 
as a having a singular identity to begin with, a singular iden-
tity that is universalizable. We would start at the level of in-
dividuals’ for flourishing and try to make a universalizable de-
mand from this that fit all individuals. Rather than creating 
more and more refined identities, we would start at the level of 
experiences and wants. In other words, as Brown (1995) suggests, 
instead of starting with the question of “Who are we?” we would 
start with the question of “What do we want?” (p. 75). This uni-
versalized want from the totality of singularites can be summa-
rized as the want to flourish. Flourishing is different for each 
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individual, yes, but the necessary conditions for flourishing 
are not so broad in scope. But to what point have we come? 
 
V. NEVER POSSIBLE OR ALWAYS ONLY POSSIBLE? 
When the trajectory of our political demands takes the form 
of trying to answer the question of what we want, we enter the 
realm of desire. In other words, we are no longer sutured to the 
political and the seeking of justice as the be all and end all 
of human pursuit. Thus, when political demands pass through the 
realm of desire, we are allowed a way to sidestep the nihilism 
that might otherwise ensue in the realization that the project 
of justice can never be completed. We sidestep this because we 
are given the command to never give up upon our desire, upon 
that which we cannot know. In other words, the question of  
“What do we want?” is as unanswerable as completed justice is 
unattainable. However, the question of what we want partakes in 
a type of infinity that is always complete. It’s an infinity, 
yes, but one that revolves around an impossibility. Justice, on 
the other hand, has an infinite incompletion. It chases after 
perpetual possibility, something that isn’t quite the same as an 
impossibility. An impossibility is never possible, a perpetual 
possibility is always only possible. To take the eternal return 
as an example, we can never say, “Thus, I willed it,” to the 
past. It’s a forgone conclusion that this is impossibility. Yet 
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we enter into the eternal return knowing this, so we will in the 
face of the non-volitional. Similarly, we never give up on our 
desire—that part of ourselves that we can never know—fully aware 
that there is an impossibility at the core of our pursuit. So at 
bottom, to pass political demands through desire allows us to 
have the sort of completion that we have in the eternal return 
and with never giving up on our desire. 
True, we’re only bound to repeat endless iterations of 
never giving up upon that which we can’t know, but this circular 
structure has built within it a mechanism that allows us the 
possibility of never giving up. We’re pursuing something that 
can’t be had, so in a way there’s no room for giving up. We know 
from the outset that once we enter into this circular trajectory 
we’re pursuing for the sake of pursuing, desiring and willing 
for its own sake, not for an object. The object is impossible, 
and the impossible can never itself be the ground for pursuit. 
At most, it is the cause of our pursuit. Political demands for 
justice don’t have this same mechanism. Justice is the ever pos-
sible object of the political demand. Here, we are pursuing for 
the sake of an object. What will satisfy our demand is transpar-
ent. It’s only there will necessarily be other demands to sat-
isfy, and perpetually so. So in order to avoid the despair of 
there always being perpetual possibilities, we might enter jus-
tice instead as we enter desire. We should enter into its pur-
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suit for the sake of pursuit, not thinking of justice as the ob-
ject, as—in a utilitarian way—the end for which our pursuit is 
but a means. 
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Chapter 6: Concluding Scholarship? 
 
We’ve seen in the second chapter that the network is what’s 
in excess of the governed, and that network inefficiency was the 
initial limit from where intellectual inquiry proceeded. Along 
with this inefficiency came the time necessary for rational de-
liberation, something useful for the political, and now that the 
network is speedy, this speediness should not necessarily be 
aligned with the urgency of necessary political actions. Al-
though actions might need to be rushed in order to postpone 
death, the thoughts behind them mustn’t be. In the third chap-
ter, we saw how the scholar might make use of the efficient net-
work: We can stroll through it. This strolling through the net-
work resists what network efficiency tends to steal from the 
scholar. Network systemization that comes with indexing tends to 
steal the individual (non-divisible), intellectual paths of the 
scholar, but not if we have fidelity to a kind of productive 
wandering. In the fourth and fifth chapters, we saw how we need 
to think of both the technological and the political in terms of 
a valuing that is not through time. This has implications for 
the political insofar as it displaces urgency as the sole obli-
gation of the political. We should see the political independent 
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of chronology, and instead conceptualize the political in terms 
of a type of willing particular to the eternal return. We thus 
see how a model of desire helps us understand the political. So 
where have we come? We’ve come to a point that prepares us to 
address the worry I had when I began thinking about this docu-
ment. 
 Broadly, my worry can be phrased as, “What should I—someone 
who’s not incidentally attempting to be officially designated as 
a scholar with the completion of this dissertation—be doing?” If 
there’s an ethics of scholarship, it’s the question underlying 
that. How ought I live as a scholar? I felt that this was an im-
portant question to ask because the answer we had to that ques-
tion might not hold anymore. I’ve come to the point where what I 
think is something somewhat frightening. I’m wholly convinced 
that scholarly research as we’ve known it—at least the type of 
research we do in the humanities and some strands of social sci-
ence—is unnecessary. 
Scholarly research is unnecessary. This is frightening, but 
only for the scholarly profession. Network efficiency gives peo-
ple speedy access to knowledge, something that in the past 
would’ve taken decades of study to accomplish only partially. 
This should be good news in general. The utility of the scholar 
was in the fact of the scholar’s expertise, that the scholar had 
suffered the labor of becoming an expert for the benefit of oth-
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ers. But if everyone can become an expert without suffering 
through the labor, good! This is only bad news for the scholar 
because it seems that the scholar needs to find something else 
to do to be esteemed. 
 
I. A SHAMEFUL ADMISSION 
Why is the ease with which we accomplish our task as schol-
ars consciously unacknowledged? Why do we behave now as though 
the product of scholarly labor is worthy of the same esteem as 
scholarship produced without the aid of network efficiency? I 
believe it’s for the reason that there’s something like fetish-
istic disavowal happening. There’s something that’s avowed, but 
this avowal is repressed. Thus, in conscious discourse, what’s 
avowed in the unconscious is at the same time not known. 
To be esteemed and to be desired are different. This is for 
the reason that though sublimation, like desire, has its origin 
in the drives, sublimation satisfies the drives by inhibiting 
their aim. This satisfaction comes in the form of the esteemed, 
and esteem can only be had in conscious discourse. The criteria 
for evaluation must be readily knowable, and the evaluations 
must be transparent. But might there not remain something re-
pressed in sublimation? No one can sublimate fully, after all.  
Might not what remains repressed—still—after sublimation be 
the paternal metaphor? This must be repressed at all times if 
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the subject is to remain a subject. As we know, given certain 
physical circumstances, the dissolution of subjectivity could 
result in psychotic thought. If sublimation doesn’t threaten a 
subject with possible psychosis, it would only make sense that 
after sublimation, the paternal metaphor remains repressed. This 
is not to say, however, that the function of the paternal meta-
phor remains the same in sublimation as in desire. 
Whereas the paternal metaphor prohibits access to a unity 
to the maternal body in desire—this is the prohibition of in-
cest—I am suggesting that the paternal metaphor has the function 
of shame in sublimation. And this is where there is a disconti-
nuity, one that looks much like fetishistic disavowal. The sig-
nifier of shame remains repressed, but esteem given after com-
pleted sublimation must be conscious. 
Esteem and shame aren’t on an oppositional spectrum. Things 
on an oppositional spectrum don’t have a “zero” midpoint that 
connects them. In other words, there shouldn’t be something 
that’s neither esteem worthy nor shame worthy. The midpoint of 
an oppositional spectrum is a point of equilibrium, not nei-
ther/nor. There are things that are neither worthy of esteem nor 
shame, but not things worthy of esteem as much as they are wor-
thy of shame. Esteem and shame should not otherwise be bound to-
gether, for they aren’t opposites, but merely different. How-
ever, I believe that they must become bound together for the 
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reason that sublimation does not escape the purview of the pa-
ternal metaphor. 
 
II. ESTEEM AND SHAME 
With esteem comes a sense of accomplishment, a sense of 
achieving an ideal state. Shame, however, isn’t merely an emo-
tional response to a failure to achieve some ideal state. This 
would imply a continuum of shame to esteem. Though there is the 
shame that acts as a deterrent—something that stops you from do-
ing something—the other end of this is not having achieved es-
teem, but shamelessness. Further, we use the term shame to refer 
to a particular affect, and this seems to contradict my argu-
ment, for if shame is an affect, how can the paternal metaphor 
function as shame in sublimation? There are no unconscious af-
fects, after all. Though it’s obvious that there’s an affect be-
longing to shame, shame must be more than an affect if it’s to 
have a place in the unconscious. 
Consider the phrase, “Have some shame.” Let’s take the 
phrase literally. This cannot refer to shame the affect. Because 
we don’t think of the generation of affects as being volitional, 
to command someone to have the affect of shame doesn’t make 
sense. As I’ve noted, commands are only commands in the strict 
sense if one has the choice to obey or disobey, and we aren’t in 
the realm of obedience or disobedience. But the command does 
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make sense, so there must be another way to think about shame. 
That other way is to think about it as something nomotic. 
There’s a shame that exists because there’s the context of a 
rule system. So in a sense, the phrase, “Have some shame,” can 
be interpreted as an iteration of, “Obey the rules.”  
 Because I can still feel ashamed of myself when I’ve not 
been caught, when we think of feeling shamed before others, the 
others aren’t the source of shame. The source of shame is being 
a subject through a relationship to the normative, through a re-
lationship to the law. But what does that mean, for there are at 
least two types of shame, one affective, one nomotic? We feel 
the affect of shame when we’re unable to meet the expectations 
outlined by the normative. But this is being in a relationship 
to the normative; it’s one in which we fall short of the pre-
scriptions. More importantly, we must be through a relationship 
to the normative. This means that there pertains to us a mode of 
existence that is caused by the law, that we’re able to perceive 
ourselves only because the law precedes us. In other words, to 
be able to have some shame, we must be normative subjects. So 
though we may feel shame before others, it’s the Big Other be-
fore which we have it. This is why I hesitate to fully adopt 
Nussbaum’s (2006) perspective on shame. Though there’s no lack 
of clarity between the feeling of shame and nomotic shame, there 
is a lack of clarity between others and the Big Other. What I 
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would add is that it’s for this reason that Nussbaum doesn’t 
consider the difference between actual shame and shame as a po-
tential. 
 For potentials to remain potentials as such, they can never 
be actualized. Otherwise, they pass over into something else; 
they become something other than what they were. This is one way 
to think about desire, for example. Desire is a type of potenti-
ality. Were desire to ever catch up to its object, then it 
wouldn’t be desire. It would pass over into something else. If 
we think of desire as being something that’s perpetual—at least 
when it’s functional—then we can’t really think of desire as be-
ing a desire for or directed toward an object. That’s why we in-
stead think of desire as being without an object and only having 
an object cause. If desire is to continue, it must be the object 
cause that passes over into something else, not the desire. It’s 
for this reason that objet a is the first in a series. 
 But this is desire. Sublimation is different. Sublimation 
is purposive and achieves satisfaction. In other words, sublima-
tion has an object, and that object is the esteemed. This is the 
necessarily conscious part of sublimation. Because sublimation 
originates in the drives, however, it becomes related to some-
thing repressed, and that repressed something becomes the origin 
of shame. The paternal metaphor—as in desire—remains the origin 
of the law, and nomotic shame by definition cannot exist without 
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the law. So although esteem and shame are not on an oppositional 
spectrum, they do become tied together through something that 
functions like disavowal. 
 
III. THE SCHOLAR’S SHAME 
 Let’s make our discussion a bit more concrete. What I am 
suggesting is that non-affective, nomotic shame is equivalent to 
becoming a subject through a relationship to the law. We have 
this shame not when we fail to live up to an ideal. This is the 
affective, dualistic shame in the Imaginary. In the Symbolic, we 
have shame period. This is the position we’re in through the re-
lationship that allows us to remain subjects even as when we 
sublimate, when the drives achieve satisfaction. The prohibition 
of the paternal metaphor in desire is replaced with a mere posi-
tioning with regard to the law, for there is no forbidden in 
sublimation. There needn’t be a forbidden, for the aim of the 
drives must be inhibited as the condition of the satisfaction to 
be achieved. The law without prohibition itself becomes pure 
authority, and shame is how we can characterize the subject’s 
relationship to this authority that does not prohibit. We have 
shame before the law, especially when the law is not prohibiting 
anything. So here, we can get back to our question. Why can we 
not admit to the ease with which we can now perform our tasks as 
scholars? 
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 We can’t admit to the ease for the laws by which we func-
tion as academics do not allow us to do so. Esteem must be 
earned. Esteem is a question of desert. If the norms of academe 
are still norms of rigorous study, then we cannot achieve esteem 
through the proxy of the efficient network. I am not arguing 
that we need to rid ourselves the norms of rigorous study. I'm 
only pointing out that our norms are no longer compatible with 
our material conditions, with the condition that we have access 
to a network that makes possible what had not been. The norms 
functioned as norms with the no longer obtaining presupposition 
that the efficient access we have to recorded knowledge now is 
not possible. 
 
IV. BEYOND THE SCHOLAR’S DISAVOWAL 
 Are we thus caught at an impasse? I’ve implied that the fo-
cus on the political might have been a stopgap solution to the 
problem. I’m asserting it now that I’ve explained the problem 
that the efficient network causes for scholarship. We focused on 
the political as an attempt to change the norms of academe to 
fit the material conditions of our craft: Now that it’s easier 
to produce research, it must be politically useful in order to 
be esteemed. But I think that this isn’t a permanent solution 
for the reason that changing the world shouldn’t be an end. 
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Change in the world is what there is. As we’ve seen in with 
the discussion about Nietzsche and desire, whether or not the 
pursuit of desire is flippant in light of human suffering, the 
pursuit or non-pursuit doesn’t have much impact upon change in 
the world. In some sense, to believe in the difficulty of chang-
ing the world is to relieve us of the oppressive responsibility 
that comes with not being able to do anything but partake in a 
changing world. In fact, in spite of our best efforts, the world 
changes. The difficulty lies in keeping things the same. It’s 
only with great difficulty that we can create a conception of 
the world and impose our will upon the world so that it conforms 
with that will. This, as I’ve argued, is the project of the po-
litical. Phrased another way, the political does not seek to 
change things, but to make the world conform to the will—and 
keep it that way. The aim most appropriate to the political is 
an eternal state of more of the same. 
 So the political is not about changing the world. Still, 
could it not be an aim worthy of esteem? It can’t be worthy of 
esteem because it’s actually an object of shame, of affective 
shame. The political addresses urgency. Urgency is a response to 
necessity. We don’t esteem the accomplishment of the necessary. 
I win no esteem, for instance, by keeping my child alive. If I 
have a child, it’s urgent that I do this, and it’s what I ought 
to do. Esteem must surpass the necessary. Affective shame, how-
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ever, exists when I fail to do what I ought. So it isn’t the 
case that as academics, we should feel shame for not being more 
politically active. We should feel this shame as citizens. The 
political is not the type of law that lacks prohibition, so we 
should feel it! 
 We can’t esteem ourselves as academics when we live up to 
the ideal of being a citizen. This is to cheat at the game, to 
bait and switch. Rather, we should focus upon re-evaluating the 
norms of academe. We should focus upon finding something else to 
do. If the law pertaining to sublimation is not a prohibition, 
this is not to say that it isn’t a command. The law pertaining 
to sublimation is an imperative to do something original. We 
must do something that is not heretofore possible. We must chase 
what is necessarily never able to be complete—and we must be 
willful enough to not give up. The drives in sublimation may be 
satisfied because their aims become inhibited and are instead 
directed toward an object, but that object becomes the trans-
gression of the norms, the pursuit of the original, which itself 
is a proximity to the origin. 
 It’s for this reason that I think the law of sublimation is 
not a prohibition. The law of sublimation is an imperative to 
transgress the law, to go beyond what the law foresees. Do we 
not say an original work is original insofar as it breaks with 
what has become conventional. Do we not esteem this kind of 
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work? In art, do we not esteem work that breaks with the conven-
tions of a genre, for instance. In intellectual inquiry, do we 
not esteem work that breaks the barriers of what had heretofore 
been an impasse? What we must do is make for ourselves a new 
challenge. 
The challenge coming with the condition of our access to 
the efficient network is to work against the burden of the ab-
sence of forgetting. It was easier to do this when the origins 
were forgotten, but we now have access to a prosthetic and very 
effective memory. These, therefore, are anxious, not mournful 
times. They’re anxious for instead of having a loss to grieve, 
there’s an overwhelming completeness. To relieve our anxiety, we 
must make what’s now complete again incomplete. We must return 
to this origin to be original, for adding more words into what 
has become an already too burdensome historical malady can’t 
possibly be the answer. It seems we only have one direction 
left. We need to gesture toward an incompletion. This incomple-
tion can only be gestured toward because it’s necessarily the 
inexpressible, and it’s expressing this impossibility that we 
mustn’t give up on. But what would this look like? We’ll only 
know when we’re able to transgress the obtaining law of sublima-
tion and create a new one. We’ll only know when we’re able to 
value differently. This ending will be too abrupt, but its 
abruptness will be in keeping with my suggestion. 
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Might we perhaps consider valuing teaching over publica-
tion? Let’s be good companions to our apprentice flâneurs.  
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